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Abstract 
Title: Do firms with excess cash pay higher premia? 
Seminar date: 2014-06-04 
Course: BUSN89 Degree project in corporate and financial management (15 ECTS) 
Authors: Jonas Magnusson and Fiyinfoluwa Olayisade 
Supervisor: Niclas Andrén 
Key words: Mergers and acquisitions; Premia; Excess cash; Overconfidence; Hubris; Public 
acquisitions 
Purpose: Self-interest and development of our knowledge. After research we found this 
interesting field of study. The thesis investigates if firms with higher excess cash pay higher 
premium prices. We analyze this from a behavioral point of view. 
Methodology: This study implements a quantitative approach. For calculating excess cash we 
use Opler et al. (1999) approach. For bid premia model we use Alexandridis et al. (2013) 
approach. Testing our hypothesis we use regression analysis. We also include a survivorship 
bias approach. 
Theoretical perspective: This study is built upon previous research in this field of study with 
an emphasis on bid premia and excess cash. 
Empirical foundation: Public acquisitions by firms in the S&P 500 index; we also include 
dropped firms to bypass survivorship bias. Henceforth we show the importance of such an 
approach. Our sample consists of 519 non-financial firms, 565 public acquisitions and 2684 
private acquisitions. 
Conclusions: In this investigation we find support for our main hypothesis, which says that 
excess cash is statistically significant in the regression model. The interpretation is that the 
more excess cash a firm has, the more they overbid. 
Acknowledgements: We like to thank associate professor Niclas Andrén for his guidance and 
specific knowledge in the field of corporate finance with emphasis on excess cash. 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the background and problem discussion providing the basis from which 
the purpose of the study is built and the research question defined. 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Low Cost of debt 
The Global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-2011 sent shockwaves around the world and 
today we are still left with the effects of the spectacle. One effect that is still in place today is 
that of the low interest landscape that spans most of the developed world. The GFC crisis 
forced major intervention from the central banks of the world, under heavy pressure from 
their residents. The actions came in the form of the central banks invoking fiscal and 
monetary measures (Cecchetti, 2009), in order to stimulate borrowing and investments to kick 
start their economies growth. For example the Federal Reserve, (the central bank of the 
United States), led by then chairman Ben Bernanke; by December of 2008, the Federal 
reserve Fund rate, the interest rate for the US from which other lending rates in the US are 
based off i.e. bank lending rate, mortgage rates, credit card rates, dropped to 0.25 from 5.25 in 
September 2007, and has remained at this level till today. 
 Source: Bloomberg 
 These sustained low rates have led to: (i) Reduced borrowing costs on household and 
corporate level. This encourages investments both on consumer and corporation level 
(Cecchetti, 2009). (ii) Institutional Investors seeking out high yielding investments when 
faced with a zero-yield environment. This occurrence is called “chasing the yield” (Lachman, 
2004). As such there has been an increase in demand for fixed-income investment, which has 
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lowered borrowing costs for both investment grade and high yield issuers of debt (Economist, 
2013). It is in this condition in which we find the current debt capital markets today. 
1.1.2 Conservative Capital Structures 
There is a plethora of research both theoretical and empirical around the subject of capital 
structures. We though have summarized the key characteristics that an optimal capital 
structure should entail into the following three statements;  
i) A low cost of capital 
ii) Sufficient financial flexibility to exploit strategic opportunities that arise  
iii) Adamant buffer to protect against downside scenarios 
Yet in the wake of the GFC many firms have adopted conservative capital structures rather 
than try to achieve an optimal capital structure. This was due to the preference by firms to 
under go major de-leveraging in order to maintain low probabilities of distress as to keep or 
improve their credit rating. In a paper published by J.P. Morgan in December 2008, 
“Conservative capital structures”, they found that lower cost of capital for firms was 
attributed to higher credit ratings. With credit rating agencies adopting tougher standards, it 
was imperative for firms to adopt a more conservative capital structure in order to maintain a 
favorable credit rating as they sought to ride out the ensuing credit storm. These actions are in 
line with results from Khieu and Pyles (2012) study on the influence of a credit rating change 
on corporate cash holdings”. The report states downgraded firms increase excess cash 
holdings by approximately 3%. They also found that firms downgraded from investment to 
speculative grade hoard the most cash. The results suggest that a concern for financial 
constrains, in addition to the costs of declining ratings, are in play in firms decision making. 
But fast-forward to today; many of these firms still have these conservative structures in place 
despite the storm having passed by. Similarly, in the wake of GFC due to regulation and 
pressures from shareholders, most firms increased their liquidity buffer to protect against any 
potential downside scenarios.  
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1.1.3 Cash vs. Debt 
Source: J.P. Morgan & Bloomberg 
We can see from the graph above that firms are holding unprecedented levels of cash and 
this has increased steadily from the onset of financial crisis up until today. It seems evident 
that firms have revised what is deemed a “sufficient” liquidity profile in order to exploit 
strategic opportunities. Yet many outsiders deem it over excessive and are pressurizing firms 
to start seeking out strategic opportunities on which to spend their excess liquidity on. For 
example, On April 23, 2013, Apple announced its intention to pay out a total of $100 billion 
in cash by the end of calendar year 2015, the largest total payout ever authorized (Apple, 
2013). This came due partly to a lawsuit filed by investor David Einkorn of Greenlight 
Capital. It is in this condition in which we find firms capital structure today in the USA. 
1.2 Landscape Characteristics 
1.2.1 Positive market reaction to firms utilizing debt to make strategic alternatives 
As a function of the described state of US firms’ capital structures above, firms who have 
started to take up leverage again and move towards a more ideal capital structure, are reaping 
the rewards of positive market reaction to these actions (J.P. Morgan, 2014). In today’s 
landscape it seems taking on debt to pursue strategic goals that will benefit shareholder value 
is seen as a positive step and market participants are rewarding firms that do this. The debt 
taken on has been used to pursue strategic alternatives such as to pay down existing costly 
debt or returning money to shareholders through dividends or share buybacks schemes. Such 
companies who have undertaken these are Viacom, Costco, FedEx, Amgen, Apple, 
WeightWatchers and EMC2.  
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1.2.2 Shareholder activism 
Shareholder activism is a mechanism in which shareholders can influence a firm’s 
decisions by exercising their rights as owners (Gillan and Starks, 2000). In 2013 shareholder 
activism was very pronounced (Weingarten and Rosewater, 2013). In fact activist hedge fund 
have been so successful that funds flowing into these funds has led to their asset under 
management to rise from $36bn in 2009 to $100bn in 2013 (Watts, 2014). The main issues 
that these hedge fund activists have been addressing are: conservative capital structure and 
excessive liquidity. 
“While it is important for the Board to focus on the return of capital on a 
sustained basis, it is also important for the Board to evaluate whether or not 
its share price is undervalued and to take advantage of it with share 
repurchases, especially when the balance sheet exhibits dramatic excess 
liquidity, as we believe Apple’s does today. - Carl Icahn Apple Investor 
Letter  
“This underperformance has been driven by the Company’s 1) outsized cost 
structure, 2) inefficient capital structure, 3) poor M&A track record and 4) 
execution issues caused by unsuccessful extensions into security and 
enterprise switching” - Elliott Management’s Juniper Board of Directors 
Presentation 
“We expect management to optimize Helen of Troy‘s balance sheet to 
maximize shareholder value. Helen of Troy is materially under-levered 
relative to peers Jarden and Spectrum Brands. A more appropriate capital 
structure would create substantial value for shareholders in light of the 
unique strategic attributes of the business” -Scott Ferguson (Founder of 
Sachem Head Capital management) Board of Directors Letter 
1.2.3 Interesting M&A landscape 
The highest premiums on targets tend to be on deals that are contested between multiple 
bidders. But in 2013, according to Dealogic, there where only 15 takeover deals that involved 
rival bids, the lowest since 2004 (Monga, 2013). This could be a major factor in why the bid 
premia on acquisition, based on the target’s trading price one week before the deal was 
announced, were at 18 year low of just 19% (Monga, 2013). A reason for this could be down 
to the buoyant stock markets, which with prices increasing daily can complicate negotiations. 
With high stock prices acquiring firms might feel that target firms are already over valued and 
as such to pay top-up premium of this would be way too much. However, what is more 
puzzling is the lack of deals that have been occurring in today’s landscape given the access to 
cheap liquidity and large cash holdings on the balance sheet as well as the fact that the market 
seems to rewarding companies that are taking on deals. Stock prices of acquirers have 
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increased an average of 2.4% between the day before and the day after a deal, the largest 
average increase since 2006 according to Dealogic database (Monga, 2013). This is the 
interesting M&A landscape in which we found ourselves at the end of 2013. 
1.3 Problem discussion 
At the end of 2013, the global cash pile of multi-national corporations (MNC’s) was 
estimated to be around $2.7tn, with 200 companies holding around $2.2tn or 71% of the 
global cash pile (Masters, 2014). The top 5 MNC’s companies held cash piles equivalent to 
the gross domestic product of the United Arab Emirates (Sakoui, 2014). Looking at the US 
specifically, corporations are holding record-high cash holdings (Sanchez and Yurdagul 
(2013) but the reasons behind this are greatly debated but mainly center around; less 
investment opportunities for firms leading to more cash holdings; repatriation of cash held 
abroad by multinationals having adverse tax consequences; record profits leading to an 
increase in cash flows (Pinkowitz et al. 2014). Interestingly, at the 2014 World Economic 
Forum in Davos, CEO’s of some of the worlds largest MNC’s commented that they would sit 
on their cash piles until they could invest in the right target companies and that large cash 
piles could become the new normal for companies. But many commentators are still 
predicting that 2014 will be the year of the megamergers driven by; favorable credit 
conditions in conjunction with a rise in cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as 
firms try to diversify their portfolios to mitigate risk in light of financial crisis whilst gaining 
exposure to faster growing markets (Domm, 2014). According to Harford (1999), high valued 
markets act as a precursor for the onset of a new merger wave, something that is evident if 
one took a look at equity markets at the end of 2013 (see diagram on next page); S&P 500 
reaching 16-year highs and The Dow reaching 18-year highs, that. 
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Source: Bloomberg 
As a testament to the bullish views of some commentators, 2014 has got off to a 
blockbuster start with the shining star being the Technology, Media and Telecom industry. 
According to Mergermarket©, six of the largest deals have been announced in this space. As 
organic growth has been hard to come by for many of these firms in recent years, they have 
thrust their hopes into inorganic growth, under the watchful eyes of activist investors. These 
activist investors have championed for firms to reduce there over capitalized balance sheet 
and create more value for their shareholders. Facebook’s $19bn acquisition of WhatsApp and 
$2bn for Oculus VR, Google $3.2bn acquisition of Nest labs are some of the deals that many 
have been questioned due to their astronomical prices. Why? The firms acquired were either 
making little or no profit or had just left the infantile stage, therefore did not warrant the 
prices paid. These actions seemed to be displays by overconfident CEOs showing that money 
is not a problem when it comes to acquiring firms they desired. Perhaps the youthfulness of 
these CEO’s could be contributing to their overconfidence and their behavior; Ferris, 
Jayaraman and Sabherwal (2009) concluded that though CEO overconfidence is an 
international phenomenon, it is most extensively observed in younger individuals heading 
firms headquartered in Christian countries that encourage individualism. They also found that 
overconfidence is related to a number of aspects of merger.  
But this topic had us intrigued and stimulated questions for us when researching into 
potential thesis topics. 
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1.4 Basis of research 
Would these CEO’s act in such a way, if not for their large internal cash resources; Do 
these cash balances have an impact on how much the firms CEO’s bid; Had the acquisition 
landscape turn into a playground that only the cash-rich could play in. With all these 
questions ruminating in our heads, we undertook background research to try to come up with 
satisfactory conclusions to some of these questions. In our search we came upon this abstract 
from Malmendier and Tate 2005 paper, “Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and 
the market’s reaction”: 
“Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment 
projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest 
when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they 
require external financing” 
Diving more into this, we came across Hayward and Hambrick (1997) study that examined 
the role of the CEO and if the individual portrays exaggerated self-confidence, called “CEO 
hubris”. More specifically, they investigate if this hubris variable affects the size of the paid 
bid premium in large acquisitions, which they found strong support for. We also found when 
reading Moller et al. (2014) paper that they found that managers of large firms offer higher 
bid premiums. 
 On the face of it, the research we came across seemed to rationalize that there was a 
relationship between overconfidence, internal funding and CEO’s overinvestment. We felt 
this offered an interesting topic to explore for our thesis and so our topic was established. 
1.5 Research Question 
It became apparent that certain aspects of our thesis topic had been covered extensively 
whilst others had not been studied depth. Areas such as acquisition premia in relation to 
M&A’s have been examined in only a minority of M&A studies (Hitt et al. 2001). According 
to Hitt et al. (2001) most M&A’s revolve around the following questions: 
i. The extent to which the acquisition increased the diversiﬁcation of the acquiring 
ﬁrm/the relatedness of the acquiring ﬁrm (58% of the studies);  
ii. Firm size or the relative size of the acquired to the acquiring ﬁrm (52% of the studies);  
iii. The acquisition experience of the acquiring ﬁrm (28% of the studies).  
Do firms with excess cash pay higher premia?  
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As acquisition premia, in relation to M&A’s, had not been expanded on in depth and with 
our interest in the increasing cash holdings, we decided to combine both. Furthermore, we 
decided that as most studies center on non-empirical research we would try to undertake an 
empirical study to try to discover any relationship. 
Therefore, we present our paper, that explores the relationship between bid premia and 
excess cash whilst answering the following question: “If a firm has more excess cash on their 
balance sheet, will they pay a higher premia?” Our purpose is to undertake initial research 
into this topic and by publishing our results would form an informative piece to the wider 
finance community that can be built upon. 
1.6 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2: will outline the Literature review. It will process the existing theory of excess 
cash holdings e.g. the value and the motives behind holding more cash. Furthermore the 
chapter will include the existing knowledge of mergers and acquisitions and premiums. 
Finally we will present the behavioral aspects of cash holdings and overconfidence. 
Chapter 3: will outline the chosen methodology: It will explain our methodology, how we 
collected data, constructed our sample and the research approach. Furthermore it will process 
the models for excess cash and premium prices. Finally this chapter will assess the validity of 
the methods to ensure the quality of our study. 
Chapter 4: will outline our empirical findings from our regressions. 
Chapter 5: continues with the analysis and discussion of the results.  
Chapter 6: In this chapter we will outline our conclusion of the study together with further 
research suggestions. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
This section will process the existing theory of excess cash holdings and the existing 
knowledge of mergers and acquisitions. We will present the behavioral aspects in relation to 
both. Finally, we will first present our primary and secondary hypothesis. 
2.1 Motives of holding cash 
The motives behind holding cash are, firstly related to the transaction cost theory. Firms 
are more reliant on internal financing in order to minimize external costly financing when 
faced with investment opportunities (Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 
2004). Secondly there is a speculative motive, which Keynes (1937) argues for in that firms 
hold cash in order to meet unexpected changes in the market, be it increased interest rates or 
the impact of volatile markets. The holding of cash is done to increase liquidity preferences 
when capital markets are unfavorable i.e. the adverse selection costs make equity too 
expensive (Keynes, 1937; Opler et al. 1999). 
The third motive is the precautionary, and this is mostly related to the constrained firms, as 
they are more sensitive to cash flow volatility. This creates an intertemporal trade-off between 
current and future investments (Han and Qiu, 2007). Han and Qiu (2007) go on to explain that 
financially constrained firms tend to increase cash holdings in response to an increase in cash 
flow volatility due to the fact that there exists a limited diversifiable option on future cash 
flows. For the unconstrained firms there exists no systematic relationship between cash 
holdings and volatility, suggesting that there is no precautionary motive for cash holdings. 
The fourth explanation of cash holdings is the tax motive. Firms that are exposed to higher 
tax rates in their home country are not willing to repatriate cash to trigger larger tax expenses, 
thus creating more consolidated cash holdings (Opler et al. 1999; Foley et al. 2007). Foley et 
al. (2007) also shows that affiliates in low tax based countries hold more cash than other 
affiliates of the same firm; hence this increases cash holdings abroad. 
The last motives of cash holdings are agency related, explaining the conflict of interest 
between managers and stakeholders. Managers’ control are reduced when they pay dividends 
to shareholders, increasing the capital necessity, forcing the firm to obtain external capital and 
thus increases monitoring of the capital markets (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 2984). 
According to Jensen (1986) this is especially severe when the firm is generating substantial 
free cash flows and this can be explained by the fact that compensation to managers are 
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positively related to growth in sales (Murphy, 1985). They are more likely to spend money on 
investments than satisfy shareholders if the opportunity exists. Managers of firms with large 
free cash flows are more likely to undertake value destroying projects, though consideration 
are of importance e.g. firms paying with cash are more likely to generate some value 
enhancing returns since this temporarily reduces the cash holdings and therefore beneficial for 
shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Managers have stronger motives for cash holdings since this tend 
to reduce firm risk and increase their discretion (Opler et al. 1999). 
2.2 The value of cash 
For firms cash is a vital component that allows them to undertake value-increasing 
investment that otherwise might have been bypassed (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Faulkender 
and Wang, 2006). By having higher cash holdings, firms are more independent from external 
costly financing, consequently reducing their cost of capital. In recent studies of cash 
holdings, some researchers have disagreed with Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) view that 
investments and growth are independent of the availability of internal funds. Such researchers 
are, Myers and Majluf (1984) who state that frictions in the capital market increase the cost of 
outside capital and hence make internally generated capital more favorable. By having 
internal funds, managers increase their flexibility when choosing to invest or not in projects. 
Rather than being faced with the prospect of turning down a valuable investment opportunity 
because external financing is too expensive or there is no option than to issue risky securities, 
this retention of cash offers an escape. Especially when researchers such as Myers and Majluf, 
(1984), state that valuable investment opportunities should be turned down if faced with the 
prospect of having to obtain external financing or issuing risky debt. This concept can be 
related to the pecking order theory in that it states that the most favorable financing option is: 
(i) internally generated cash, and (ii) if necessity of external financing, firms should issue debt 
rather than equity (Donaldson, 1961; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Denis and Sibilkov (2009) developing on previous studies on the impact of financial 
constrains, proved that cash holdings are especially essential for constrained firms. This is due 
to a significantly stronger positive relationship between investment and cash in constrained 
firms than for unconstrained firms, as the latter has better access to capital markets. We can 
interpret this as cash holdings being a value-increasing answer to expensive external financing 
for financially constrained firms, in that higher cash holdings allow firms to undertake 
investment projects that otherwise might have been bypassed due to high costs. Denis and 
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Sibilkov (2009) also state that there is a negative relationship between financially constrained 
firms and their holdings of cash due to declining free cash flows and thus do not allow them 
to build adequate cash reserves. For constrained firms to increase adequate cash reserves, 
Almeida et al. (2004) suggest that when free cash flows are higher due to improved market 
conditions, they should increase their propensity to retain cash. To build financial slack, firms 
can restrict dividends or issue stock in periods when information is symmetric between 
management and stockholders, nor should they pay dividends if they have to undertake a fire 
sale to recoup cash (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Opler et al. 1999). 
The value of cash depends on: (i) the solvency of a firm, (ii) distribution of cash and (iii) 
accessibility of capital markets (Faulkender and Wang, 2006). Pinkowitz and Williamson 
(2004) show that from a shareholders perspective the marginal value of cash is higher for 
firms with better growth options and more volatile investment opportunities, than those with 
fewer and more stable growth opportunities. Moreover, Faulkender and Wang (2006) show 
that the marginal value of cash decreases for firms with higher leverage or cash holdings. 
Since transactions costs are likely to be higher, firms that have more difficulty accessing 
capital markets place higher value on cash than for those with good access (Faulkender and 
Wang, 2006; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2004). For firms that distribute cash, the marginal 
cash value is higher than when using stock repurchases instead of dividends (Faulkender and 
Wang, 2006). 
2.3 Evolution of US Company cash holdings  
A persistent and increasing pattern has been evident since the 1980s in US firms cash 
holdings collectively. The changes in cash holdings from the pre-GFC period to the post-GFC 
period are nothing in comparison to the cash holdings from the late 1990s to before the crisis 
(Pinkowitz et al. 2014). Annual growth rate from 1979 to 1997 was around 6.5%, while after 
mid-1990s until 2011 the growth rate was above 9% (Sanchez and Yurdagul, 2013). These 
changes are astronomical when compared to changes in the rest of the world: since the late 
1990s there has been a 111% increase in the median cash/assets ratio in the U.S. compared to 
36% increase in the rest of the world. Additionally, though cash/assets ratios have increased 
for public firms throughout the 2000s, they have not for private firms (Pinkowitz et al. 2014). 
This increase in US average cash–ratios is due to; riskier cash flows, holding of fewer 
inventories and accounts receivable, and the increasing of R&D intensity (Bates et al. 2009). 
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2.4 Mergers & acquisition 
The research on M&A is quite extensive and has produced a substantial amount of theories 
and empirical evidence concerning various parts of the M&A transaction cycle. Despite this, 
the question of whether takeovers improve corporate performance is controversial. Reed et al. 
(2007) stated that M&A are one of the most complex transactions one can undertake. There 
transactions can have several motives for M&As that Cooke (1986) list as; acquisition of 
particular assets, reduction of capacity, managerial motives, growth prospects, synergies, and 
taxation considerations. 
2.4.1 Valuation process 
There are several valuation methods that can be used in any M&A process. Hunt (2003) 
and Reis and Cory (1994) state that these methods are based on intrinsic, liquidation and 
relative value. Many academics have stated what many valuation practitioners believe; due to 
the judgmental assumptions and the complexity of forecasting future performance, valuation 
is as much an art as it is a science (Hunt. 2003, Baker et al. 2009). Adding to this, Moeller and 
Brady (2004) stated that pricing and valuation is a dynamic process that adapts to market 
conditions and the availability of data. 
Valuation multiples are extensively used when pricing M&A transactions and are often based 
on accounting measures. Consequently, if the accounting numbers have been manipulated and 
CEO’s put a large emphasis on them, there is a risk that this will lead to a high premium being 
paid out (Koller at al. (2005). 
2.4.2 Stock piles and acquisitions 
Cash rich firms and acquisitions have a strong relationship. Harford (1999) states that cash 
rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions as manager favor stock piling, which is in 
line with the hypothesis of free cash flow. Excessive cash holdings reduces the under 
investment problem for firms, since they can avoid costly external financing and still make 
investments even though cash flows are insufficient. The surplus of cash creates a financial 
flexibility for the firm. Though in Harford’s study (1999) the findings show that even though 
managers can reduce underinvestment problem, firms with stock pilings are more likely to 
make value-decreasing acquisitions. This is mostly explained by the fact that cash rich firms 
undertake diversifying acquisitions, and thus cannot derive value-creating synergies from 
such projects (Harford, 1999). 
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Opler et al. (1999) show the opposite of Harford (1999), they state that the spending on 
new projects is only marginally higher for firms with excessive cash. The explanation is that 
firms typically uses the internal funds to cover up losses instead of making acquisitions. Their 
suggestion is that further investigation is needed to find out whether shareholders benefit from 
managements hoarding of cash. 
2.4.3 Acquisition premiums  
An acquisition premium is the price paid for a target ﬁrm that exceeds its pre-acquisition 
market value. A premium is paid to entice the target ﬁrm shareholders to sell to the acquiring 
ﬁrm. This premium paid is one of the key determinants as to whether a company will acquire 
another company or not (Lorange et al. 1994; Walker 2000). Huang and Walking (1987) and 
Savor and Lu (2009) state in their papers that these premiums paid in cash-financed 
acquisitions are larger than those pain in share-for-share transactions, as target shareholders 
are to be compensated for the immediate tax implications of cash offers.  
According to Bargeron et al. (2008) findings, private companies, on average, pay lower 
premiums than public companies. They determined that public companies tend to pay a higher 
premium because operating companies expect to benefit from synergies. Potential synergies 
that can be created in the merger of the two ﬁrms are central to most justifications for bid 
premia. In the diagram below, price 2 and 3 represent prices incorporating bid premia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Pricing, synergy and value creation 
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The premium paid must not be greater than the potential synergy if the acquisition is to 
produce positive returns for the acquiring firms shareholders. But due to the challenges of 
achieving integration it is often difficult to recognize all potential synergies (Sirower, 1997). 
Another factor that may lead to higher bid premia would be the relationships between 
individuals, especially if those relationships are board interlocks (Haunschild, 1994). Another 
factor that will drive up premiums paid is the presence of multiple bidders for a particular 
target. In these case Coff (2002) states that the acquirer with the winning bid often 
overestimates a target ﬁrm’s value in a phenomenon called “the winner’s curse”.  
This curse continues after the target has been acquired, in that there is a burden for CEO’s 
to recoup the costs and extract enough synergies from the merger. Sirower (1997) suggests 
that about 70% of acquiring firms fail to deliver the sufficient results to recoup the premium 
paid. The huge pressures that CEO’s will face to make the merge successful can lead them to 
take actions that can be deemed to be due to an “aversion of loss” (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). Usual course of actions include restructuring processes to consolidate assets and sell 
off others that are considered redundant (Cascio, Young, and Morris, 1997) and large-scale 
workforce reductions (Krishnan et al. 2007). Overall most of the research suggests that paying 
high premiums is likely to result in negative performance of the ﬁrm, due to an inability to 
earn adequate returns beyond the premiums paid (Datta, Narayanan, and Pinches, 1992). 
2.4.4 Merger waves 
Merger waves are a phenomenon that both market practitioners as well as economists face 
yet after much theoretical and empirical research, there is no consensus on their cause. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) defined a merger wave as a sequence of time periods 
(two or more) in which the probability of a merger occurring is above the unconditional 
expected probability of a merger. Though merger waves can be proven (Brealey and Myers, 
2003), according to Brealey and Myers (1996) in their textbook “Principles of Corporate 
Finance”, there was an inability of financial theory to explain them.  
In recent times though, there has been recent debates about the cause of mergers with two 
different schools of taught emerging, behavioral and neoclassical. 
2.4.5 Merger waves – Behavioral school 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) followers of the 
behavioral school, where able to show in their studies that merger waves were highly 
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correlated with periods of high valuations. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) models also showed that merger waves resulted from managerial timing 
of market overvaluations of their firms. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) find that 
valuation of the market fuel M&A waves i.e. when market is overvalued there tend to be more 
M&A activity vice versa. Their suggestion of why M&A waves occur is that there is a 
deregulation in the market and thus increases demand or there are innovation changes that 
require redeployments of assets. 
2.4.6 Merger waves - Neoclassical school 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) are members of the neoclassical school of thought and prior 
to Brealey and Myers (2003) were able to prove the existence of merger waves. But unlike 
Brealey and Meyers, they tied merger waves to industries and found that these waves 
clustered in certain industries, ultimately tying these to various economic, regulatory or 
technological shocks. Through a systematic analysis of industry shocks and merger activity, 
they believe it was possible to a truly understand how merger waves occurred. Their 
examining at an industry-level during the 1990s was further confirmed in the studies of 
Mulherin and Boone (2000) and Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001). The latter verified 
that merger and acquisition activities tend to cluster not only over time and by region, but also 
by industry. The activity of sectors varies between different waves and below are a list of top 
5 industries based on average annual merger activity in the US listed in their study: 
1970	   1980	   1990	  
Metals	  Mining	   Oil	  &	  Gas	   Metal	  Mining	  
Real	  Estate	  	   Textile	   Media	  &	  Telecom.	  
Oil	  &	  Gas	   Misc.	  Manufacturing	   Banking	  
Apparel	   Non-­‐Depository	  Credit	   Real	  Estate	  
Machinery	   Food	   Hotels	  
                              Source: Andreade et al. (2001) created by authors 
 Figure 3.2 Top 5 industries based on average annual merger activity  
Hartford (2005) also shared the neoclassical view that merger waves could be due to 
market timing or to clustering of industry shocks for which mergers were tools that facilitated 
change to the new environment. He expanded on the Brealey and Myers (2003) neoclassical 
view and found that economic, regulatory and technological shocks drive industry merger 
waves. Whether the industry shock led to a merger wave depended on whether there is 
sufficient overall capital liquidity. Harford’s research found that the macro-level liquidity 
component causes industry merger waves to cluster in time even if industry shocks do not. 
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2.5 Bid Premium Model 
There has been little literature published on bid premium models and only one model 
appears in any study we come across. Alexandridis et al. (2013) produced a premium model 
for their paper, “Deal size, acquisition premia and shareholder gains”, which examined the 
contradictory predictions regarding the association between the premium paid in acquisitions 
and target deal size. The model documented a negative relation between offer premia and 
target size indicating that acquirers tend to pay less for large firms, not more. In their model 
different variations of premium were the dependent variable and the main explanatory 
variable was the natural logarithm of Market-Relative Target Size (lnMRTS), alongside other 
explanatory variables. Another implication of the study is that target firm still destroys values 
around the deal announcement, making M&As unfavorable from a shareholders perspective. 
2.6 Behavioral Finance 
In the past 20 years behavioral theorists have utilized psychological rational as a method to 
explain why merger activity occur, filling the gap that financial theory has so far been unable 
to do. Financial theory states that the value of any asset is equal to the present value of its 
cash ﬂows (Bogan and Just, 2009). Therefore, assuming a strong efficient market (Fama, 
1970), a firm’s share price should reflect this information and also encapsulate any potential 
value generation by the firm. Yet firms who engage in M&A’s usually pay above market 
price, signaling that they believe that either the target firm is worth more than what the market 
says or that from the creation of a new combine entity they can generate greater value. 
Research though has found that M&A’s have had a negative effect on the shareholder wealth 
of acquiring ﬁrms (Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988; Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988; 
Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993) and their overall 
long-term proﬁtability (Fowler and Schmidt, 1988; Herman and Lowenstein, 1988; 
Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). In fact in their 2005 study, Malmendier and Tate report that 
U.S. ﬁrms spent more than $3.4 trillion on over 12,000 mergers during the last two decades, 
yet acquiring shareholders lost over $220 billion at that the announcement of merger bids 
alone between the periods of 1980 to 2001. So why do CEO’s continue to pay above market 
price despite the abundance of evidence stating there is no value in M&A’s? 
Overconfidence, confirmation bias, illusion of control, hubris theory; these are a few 
behavioral theories that have been used to describe the irrational behavior of CEO’s when it 
Do firms with excess cash pay higher premia?  
 22 
comes to merger and acquisition activity. As we are investigating bid premia, a function and 
error of M&A transaction (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), we believe that the behavioral 
explanations for why CEO’s engage in M&A will apply also to why they offer a bid premia 
(pay more than market value). Below we detail behavioral theories addressed in studies 
relating to M&A activities. 
2.6.1 Hubris effect 
In his heavily cited paper, Richard Roll (1986) proposed a non-rational motivation for 
corporate merger activity titled “hubris hypothesis.” Roll proposed that hubris, or pride, is a 
major driver of merge activity when faced with extensive evidence that states the possibility 
of achieving supernormal returns will be challenging (Bruner, 2004). Only an irrational belief 
born out of overconfidence bias, that “this particular deal will be the 1 in a million deal”, 
could prompt a firm to undertake a deal and succeed where so many others have failed.  
In relation to high premiums, hubris is CEO’s overconﬁdence that they can achieve the 
synergy projected when the ﬁrm is acquired and integrated. According to Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997), ﬁrms that are acquired when hubris plays a major role are unlikely to 
achieve the needed synergy to deem the M&A successful. Consequently, ﬁrms may pay too 
high a premium and are unable to earn adequate returns to compensate for the premium and 
also produce a positive return.  
Sirower (1997) offers 3 alternatives to hubris as a primary factor in paying too high a 
premium: (1) unfamiliarity with critical elements of the acquisition strategy, (2) lack of 
adequate knowledge of the target, and (3) unexpected problems that occur in the integration 
process. 
2.6.2 Overconfidence 
The line between confidence and overconfidence in ones ability is a very fine line. The 
former can help one take risks after weighing up the strengths and weakness of an 
opportunity; the latter can lead to a lack of proper investigation into the attributes of a project 
sometimes relying only on the availability of information (Hitt et al. 2001). This therefore can 
lead to decisions being based on a self-serving attribution of outcomes. Consequently, 
according to Malmendier and Tate (2005), an effect of “better than average” may occur. They 
found that this effect was most likely to apply to high-rank executives, based on Kruger 
(1999) and Camerer and Lovallo (1999) earlier research; showed that the “better than 
average” effect was prevalent in highly skilled individuals. Additionally, overconfidence can 
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affect the attribution of causality in that individuals expect their behaviors to produce 
successful outcomes to their actions, but if a bad outcome occurs it is down to bad luck 
(Miller and Ross 1975). It is this overconfidence and mindset that can lead to CEOs 
overestimating their ability to generate returns and consequently as a result, paying high bid 
premia for target companies (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). 
2.6.3 Illusion of control and Over-optimism 
CEO’s sit at the top of the executive structure, only governed by a board of directors, 
except in some jurisdictions were they also serve as Chairman of the board (Brickley et al. 
1997). This position at the top of the pyramid brings a power, an illusion of control, due to 
them having the final say over the firm’s strategic and investment decisions. According to 
Langer (1975) individuals are most optimistic about outcomes that they believe are under 
their control. A few years later Weinstein (1980) stated that individuals are more prone to 
overestimate outcomes to which they are highly committed. This could also lead to CEO’s 
underestimating the likelihood of failure (March and Shapira, 1987). Being at the top of the 
pyramid and having their pay linked to their ability to deliver results, would encourage top 
executives to engage in opportunistic behavior that provides them with personal gains 
(Trautwein, 1990). As acquisitions increase the size of a ﬁrm, they often have a positive effect 
on a top executive’s compensation and enhance his/her power and would lead to CEO’s. 
2.6.4 Confirmation Bias 
Montier (2002) describes this as the term used for people’s desire to find information that 
agrees with their existing pre-conceptions. Ross and Anderson (1982) describe how the 
presence of this bias can lead to the persistence of false beliefs and given an initial set of 
beliefs, according to Lord et al. (1979), individuals will tend to take new information 
conﬁrming their beliefs as absolute fact. Hence they will subject contrary information to 
intense scrutiny. Due to repetition, such a process would lead to an affirmation that whatever 
initial belief they have is correct. 
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2.7 Hypothesis formulation 
After presenting our introduction and literature review we present our hypothesis 
formulation that we will test in the study: 
In relation to public deals that we have the relevant information to obtain premia 
measurement 
Hypothesis 1: The larger a firms excess cash holdings the higher the premia 
it will pay over and above the average for a target. 
In relation to private deal where we do not have the relevant information to obtain premia 
measurement: 
Hypothesis 2: The larger a firms cash balance the more it will spend on 
acquisitions. 
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3. Method 
This section will explain our methodology, how we collected data, constructed our sample 
and the research approach. Furthermore it will process the models for excess cash and 
premium prices. Finally this chapter will assess the validity of the methods to ensure the 
quality of our study. 
3.1 Research Approach 
The theory of excess cash and its explanation of how cash holdings affect both the 
organizational firm and, the rational behavior among top management is an intriguing subject. 
To investigate this matter we will utilize, a quantitative method, collecting secondary data 
from different sources and process this with validated measurements of excess cash and bid 
premia. We will use a deductive approach, establishing our hypothesis based on existing 
theory in this field. Finally we will measure and explain the hypothesis with different 
appropriate statistical methods (Bryan and Bell, 2011). With this approach Bryan and Bell 
(2011) suggest that an epistemological consideration is suitable, and more specifically a 
positivism position as our intention is to gather facts and supply an explanation to the existing 
field. Throughout the study we will conduct our study in an objective manner, with our results 
being based on facts.  
3.2 Data Collection 
For the data collection we used the following secondary sources: Factset© database, 
Kenneth French website and Mergermarket©. We collected information from between 2002-
2012 to capture the end of the dot-com crash, the sixth wave (2003-2007), the global financial 
crisis (2008-2009) and the great recession (2010-2013). 
The data used to calculate excess cash model was collected from Factset© database, 
Kenneth French homepage1 and Standard and Poor’s© website. From Factset© we have 
downloaded all the variables for our study except for indsigma, for which we calculated using 
Kenneth French industry index measurements. The obtained data detailing the relevant M&A 
information in relation to our dataset including deal value, bid premia, target size were 
downloaded from Mergermarket© database. For this study we will only examine completed 
transactions and do not include missing observations. In order to ensure the validity of the 
                                                
1 Data available at French homepage: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ 
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study, we have been consistent with our data collecting and also to minimize systematic errors 
and skewness in the sample. 
When we initially collected the dataset they were classified into industries using Factset 
and Reuters ID’s. In order to keep in line with most studies, we had to reclassify the firms into 
French industries system using Standard Industrial classification (SIC) code. However, in 
doing this we realized that there was not a classification for “internet companies”. Rather 
firms such as Amazon, Facebook, Google, Netflix, firms that have become disruptive firms in 
their respective industries, are grouped with older firms and overall could distort results those 
industries in our model.  
3.3 Limitations 
As in line with other studies we decided that we should exclude all financial and utilities 
firms. We also decided to excludes any M&A transactions that where less than $50m, which 
is common for a study in this field. 
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Figure 3.3 Industry distribution of sample 516 firms 
3.4 Sample 
For our study we initial thought about examining firms from across the globe and 
consequently thought of using the S&P 1200 Global Index. But as we looked into what 
collecting the data would entail and how to process and analyze it, we realize that this data set 
would be too large and a lot of complications would arise. Furthermore, we did not want to 
take into account exchange rates as would be required if readjusting prices to a bas price, as 
fluctuations in this could distort data on foreign companies. Consequently we decided to focus 
on the US landscape, as it is not only the world’s largest economy with most of the world’s 
largest companies, but it also has the largest M&A volumes globally. We choose the S&P 500 
because it is a benchmark utilized by professional and scholars alike and its constituents 
would offer up reliable data. Hence our dataset consists of the constituent firms in the S&P 
500 index in 2014. Furthermore we created another sample including firms that had dropped 
out of the list between the time periods of 2002-2012. In including the dropped firms we 
Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	   Apparel	  Auto	   Beer	  Books	  Business	  equipment	  Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  Chemicals	  
Coal	  
Communication	  Construction	  Consumer	  goods	  Electrical	  equipment	  Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  Food	  Games	  Health	  Mines	  
Oil	  Other	  
Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Printing	  and	  publishing	  
Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
Retail	  
Steel	  Textiles	  
Tobacco	  Transportation	  Wholesale	  
Industry	  distribution	  of	  sample	  516	  \irms	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avoid survivorship bias for delisted firms that at some point in time had an impact on the 
overall index performance. Liang (2000) shows in his study of hedge funds that accounting 
for previous funds changes the outcome performance of the overall sample. This is especially 
important in our case since we base our study on an index that changes a lot. During our time 
period there is less than 150 firms that have survived in the S&P 500 throughout the last 15 
years. In the end we are left with a dataset that consists of 383 active firms and 136 delisted 
firms. Total firm sample is shown in appendix 1. 
3.5 Measurement 
The main objective of this study is to investigate potential relationship between firms 
holding of excess cash and the payment of a higher bid premium. Our initial tests will first be 
completed only including firms included in todays S&P 500 index constituent list, and 
subsequently to account for dropped firms within our time period. The M&A data consist of 
494 public transactions for active firms, including 71 for dropped firms. Furthermore the 
private deals consist of 2273 observations for active firms, and 411 for dropped firms. 
Appendix 2 provides information on our dataset. 
Several multiple regressions will be run using E-views 8 software, in order to empirically 
examine our research question. Multiple regressions analyze the relationship between one 
variable (dependent variable) and a set of other variables (explanatory variables or 
independent variables). Gujarati and Porter (2011) state that the objective of the regression is 
to explain the behavior of the dependent variable in relation to the behavior of the 
independent variables. We use the most frequently used method in regression analysis 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2011), Ordinary Least Squares (OWLS) to estimate our regression 
models and investigate the relationship between the dependent and the explanatory variables. 
In order for our regression models to be considered reliable they have to meet some 
assumptions. Theses assumptions of the classical linear regression model must be fulfilled to 
show that the OLS estimation fulfills its desirable best linear unbiased estimator properties 
(BLUE) (Brooks, 2008). We will undertake test to control for these assumptions. 
Assumption 1 – No correlation between the error term and independent variable 
This assumption states that there is no correlation between the error term and independent 
variable needed to obtain unbiased estimate of regression coefficients. This assumption will 
be controlled for with correlation matrix. 
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Assumption 2 – No Perfect Collinearity 
The assumption of no perfect collinearity states that there is no exact linear relationship 
among the independent variables. This assumption implies two aspects of the data on the 
independent variables. First, none of the independent variables, other than the variable 
associated with the intercept term can be a constant. Variation in the x’s is necessary. In 
general, the more variation in the independent variables the better the OLS estimates well be 
in terms of identifying the impacts of the different independent variables on the dependent 
variable. We will control for this by using a correlation matrix. Any values obtained that are 
greater than 0.8 indicate that co-linearity is present and if this is the case, the regression model 
should be reconsidered (Gujarati and Porter, 2010). 
Assumption 3 - Homoscedasticity 
The assumption of homoscedasticity states that the error terms all have the same variance 
and are not correlated with each other. This assumption means the error terms associated 
with different observations are not related to each other. We will control for this using White 
heteroscedasticity, which will correct standard errors for all regressions. 
Assumption 4 - No Autocorrelation 
The assumption of no autocorrelation states that the error term may not be correlated with 
each other. This assumptions means the error terms at one date can not be correlated with the 
error terms in the previous periods or error terms may not be correlated with each other in 
terms of other factors such as socio or geographical distance. We will control for this using 
Durbin-Watson test. 
3.5.1 Excess cash model 
To calculate this variable we used Opler et al. (1999) approach, which is an established 
model used in previous studies by Bates et al. (2009) and Pinkowitz et al. (2013). We use this 
model because it is conclusive and includes more explanatory variables then other methods 
available. For example DeAngelos et al. (2010) method to calculate excess cash does not 
include a cash flow variable, which Bates et al. (2009) argues is an important measure 
because firms with higher cash flows accumulate more cash, all else being equal. Regarding 
the Harford (1999) model, it was hard to measure some coefficient; especially cash flow 
sensitivity because we would need data of cash flows ten year prior to the start of our sample 
and this was not available in our database. The Opler et al. (1999) model was sufficient 
because we had the information available to structure the regression. 
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The model is beneficial because it is estimated each year to let the coefficients vary over 
time, thus it accounts for normal cash holdings within the industry and only estimates the 
excess of cash holdings for each observation. Companies with excess cash hold more cash 
than predicted in that year (Opler et al. 1999). In the model we include all measures that are 
commonly used; cash, market-to-book ratio, size, cash flows, working capital, research and 
development expenses, leverage, capital expenditures, dividends and indsigma (Opler et al. 
1999; Bates et al. 2009; Pinkowitz et al. 2013). To find an explanation for our hypotheses we 
will use appropriate statistical measures available in E-views. Below we present the variables 
for excess cash model. The outputs of the regression analysis are shown in appendices 3 and 4 
for current and dropped sample. We will have no thoroughly discussion regarding these since 
the model is conclusive and we use it to calculate predicted cash flows. The model is only a 
complement to our study and not the main purpose. 
3.5.1.1 Dependent variable 
Cash (lnCash): is measured by the natural logarithm of cash holdings of the firm at time 
“t”, divided by net assets. This is the dependable variable in the regression. Cash sits at the 
core of this study and will later become the independent variable, since our intention is to 
investigate if there exists a relationship between excess cash and bid premia in M&A deals. 
Excess cash is an important component in any firm’s structure providing them with financial 
flexibility which enables them to invest in positive NPV projects they might have had to 
abandon due to lack of cash. Our dependent variable in this model will be regressed against 
the predicted cash holdings in time “t”. The predicted cash holding depicts the necessary cash 
to manage the operating firm. Hence, we define excess cash as the actual cash holdings in 
time “t” minus the predicted cash holdings yielded by the Opler et al. (1999) model. 
The dependent variable gives us the instrument to distinguish between firms with an 
abnormal amount of cash and those without in order to test our hypothesis. 
3.5.1.2 Independent variables 
Market to book ratio (MB): measures the market value of the firm at time “t” divided by 
net assets at time “t”, hereafter net assets are defined as the book value of assets net of cash 
and marketable securities (Opler et al. 1999; Bates et al. 2009; Pinkowitz et al. 2013) This 
measure is an important part of cash, since market to book is a proxy for financial distress i.e. 
firms with high market to book are expected to hold more cash since the degree of 
information asymmetry between manager and investor (Opler et al. 1999; John, 1993). Stultz 
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(1990) argues that firms with lower market to book ratio have poor investment opportunities, 
even though they usually hold higher ratios of liquid assets, since they find difficulty in 
financing their investment program through the capital markets. Higher market to book ratios 
is often related to higher cash flow levels, thus explaining the variations of cash (Shyam-
Sunder and Myers, 1998). Our expectations are that this coefficient shall yield a positive 
value as in previous studies.  
Size: is measured by the natural logarithm of the book value of the firm in “2012” dollars2 
using the consumer price index. Cash holdings yields economies of scale, Alexandridis et al. 
(2013) show that size has a positive relationship to bidding premium, the larger the firm the 
higher the premia. Opler et al. (1999) shows that the larger a firm is, the less liquidity the firm 
has, which is also shown later by Bates et al. (2009). Thus we expect this value in the 
regression to be negative. 
Cash flow (CF): is measured by cash flows after interest and dividends divided by net 
assets. Firms generating higher cash flows are usually related to better investment 
opportunities (Opler et al. 1999; Bates et al. 2009). Cash flow is the determinant variable for 
cash piling; higher cash flow yields more cash and financial flexibility for firms (Bates et al. 
2009). Opler et al. (1999) finds that firms with riskier cash flow and poor access to capital 
markets hold more cash as a precautionary motive, to protect them from adverse cash flow 
shocks. We expect this value to yield a positive coefficient as in previous studies. 
Working capital (WC): is measured by current assets minus current liabilities divided by 
net asset. Current assets are also important factors in relation to cash, since these can be 
converted into cash relatively quickly, and are seen as a liquid substitute for cash (Bates et al. 
2009). Mostly this coefficient is negative as it is net of cash holdings giving us an expectation 
negative impact on the model (Opler et al. 1999; Bates et al. 2009). 
Research and development expenses (R&D): is measured by expenses in R&D divided by 
net assets. Missing values in our sample is set to zero, unless we would of only treated firms 
having R&D expense. Opler et al. (1999) finds that R&D expenses a proxy for cash holding 
firms. This since R&D is costly to finance with external capital, and thus the firm requires 
cash reserves to finance costs and also against the macroeconomic downturns to still finance 
their investments (Bates et al. 2009). This coefficient is negative, and we expect the variable 
to yield this on our sample too. 
                                                
2 Data available at: http://bls.gov 
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Leverage: is measured by long term debt plus short-term debt divided by net assets. Are 
leverage significant firms are more likely to use cash holdings to pay down debt; this yields a 
negative relationship between cash holdings and leverage (Bates et al. 2009). Leverage is 
important since it relates to the precautionary motives of cash holdings. Firms having higher 
cash reserves will use them to pay down debt to increase solvency of the firm (Bates et al. 
2009). This results in a negative relationship between cash holdings and leverage, though 
Acharya et al. (2007) find explanation for a positive relationship between cash holdings and 
leverage. 
Capital expenditures (Capex): is measured by capital expenditures divided by net asset. 
Firms with higher capital expenditures are understood as firms having less liquid assets to 
convert into cash, this is therefore an important component of cash holdings (Opler et al. 
2009). This coefficient is negative, and therefore we expect our outcome to be the same. 
Dividends: is a dummy variable taking on value one if the firm has paid dividends. 
Missing values is set to zero assuming firms have not paid dividends, unless we would only 
treat firms paying dividends to shareholders. Bates et al. (2009) suggests that firms paying 
dividends is more solvent and have greater access to capital markets. Both Bates et al. (2009) 
and Brown and Kapadia (2007) finds that firms paying less dividends has higher cash 
holdings, this results in a negative relationship between cash and dividends, thus we expect 
this variable to yield negative coefficient for predicted cash levels. 
Indsigma: is measured as the volatility in the industry, to measure this we use data 
available at Kenneth French homepage. Hence, in order to use this we need to reclassify all 
firms into French 30 industry classification system using 2-digit sic codes. We choose the 30-
industry classification because in other methods available, industries like health are not 
separated from the industry others in more simplified classifications. The volatility has a 
substantial impact on cash flow, a positive relationship that increases the level of cash when 
risk increases (Bates et al. 2009). We expect this value to yield a positive coefficient as in 
previous studies. 
The model is structured as below and using panel data set to explain the variation in cash 
holdings variation for firms each year: 
lnCash = α + β!MB + β!Size + β!CF + β!WC + β!R&D + β!  Leverage + β!Capex + β!Dividends + β!Indsigma                (1) 
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The opening balance of each year is calculated as the closing balance of the previous for 
each firm. Furthermore, we measured the M&A activity in any given year by the excess cash 
balance in the previous year as we felt this approach gives us the opportunity to investigate if 
determined excess cash holdings yielded by previous cash flows have an impact on premiums 
paid for M&A’s in following years. 
3.5.2 Bid Premia model 
In our tests we will study M&A’s made in both the public and private deal arena. The 
public deals will be tested using both regression analyses. The private deals will be tested 
using a simplified regression model. Upon calculation of excess cash, this variable will 
become our main explanatory variable in our bid premia and spending hypothesis. For bid 
premia equation we use the approach from Alexandridis et al. (2013) to explain premium as a 
function of excess cash, that contains a “private” variable which measures private acquirers in 
contrast to public acquirers, our model will not contain this variable as we will only measure 
publicly traded acquirers. Interestingly, Bargeron et al. (2008) show that private acquirers are 
more likely to pay higher premia than their public counterparts. We also exclude the variable 
“competition” as we could not obtain relevant information in relation to this from our 
database collection. A “high valuation” dummy variable replaces the activity variable as we 
are interested in the relationship between high valuation periods that display high activity and 
bid premia as explained in our literature section. Below we explain our variables: 
3.5.2.1 Dependent variable 
Bid premia one month before announcement: is the bid stock price one month before the 
acquisition announcement. It is measured as the size of the bid divided by the stock price at 
the announcement date minus one. This variable is our main dependable variable and this 
measure is robust to other measures used in Alexandridis et al. (2013). The dependent 
variable of our model is bid premium price 30 days before the announcement date. This is a 
commonly used measure by previous studies and shows robustness against other 
measurements of premium prices (Alexandridis et al. 2013). This measure will be investigated 
by cross sectional data trying to give further explanation to previous findings in this field of 
study. This measure is conclusive since it measures before the market reaction of the deal. 
Other measures available take into account the reactions after the deal has been set; this is not 
beneficial since it would not reflect the true premium value of the deal since it would be 
adjusted for after deal stock prices. 
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Bid premia one day before announcement: is the bid stock price one day before the 
acquisition announcement. It is measured as the size of the bid divided by the stock price at 
the announcement date minus one. This variable we choose because it was available in our 
database. Both measures are the actual premium paid for an acquisition by the acquirer. 
3.5.2.2 Independent variables 
Excess cash: is the main explanatory variable that is investigated to explain premium 
prices for acquisitions. It is measured as above using the Opler et al. (1999) approach. The 
main explanatory variable in this model is the excess cash variable, which has been calculated 
using the Opler et al. (1999). Our intention is to investigate if this variable explains the 
premium paid for M&A’s. The expectations are that the coefficient should be positive, saying 
that more excess cash affects premium prices. Furthermore we will perform interactions to 
analyze if there is a specific time period explaining the relationship between excess cash and 
bid premium. The interaction method is essential since it has previously been shown by that 
M&A and premium bids are reflected by the market condition i.e. when market is overvalued, 
premiums tend to be lower vice versa. Furthermore there are previous findings of industry 
specific waves by Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), which explains the interactions between 
industries. Testing this variable we include control variables, which will be presented below. 
Market relative acquirers size (lnMRAS): is the natural logarithm of the acquirer relative 
the median market valuation of all US firms at time t. This measure is significant for 
Alexandridis et al. (2013) showing that the larger the acquirer the higher the bid premia. 
Market relative target size is a recent finding by Alexandridis et al. (2013) explaining that the 
higher the target size, the less premium paid for an M&A, thus the overpayment potential is 
less for larger targets. This measure is highly significant in Alexandridis et al. (2013) study, 
and our expectations are that this should yield a negative coefficient in the regression model. 
Market relative target size (lnMRTS): is the market valuation of the target at the 
announcement date. It is measured as the natural logarithm of the market value relative the 
median market valuation of all US firms at time t. This variable is Alexandridis et al. (2013) 
main independent variable trying to explain premium prices, it is significant and the 
interpretation is that the less the size of the target the higher the bid premia. Market relative 
acquirers size is according to Moeller et al. (2004) a measure of the size of the bidder relative 
the overpayment risk. The results have been various across studies, Asquith et al. (1983) and 
Alexandridis et al. (2013) find a positive relationship interpreting that larger firm is more 
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likely to overpay on acquisitions. Travlos (1987) on the other hand finds a negative 
relationship; an explanation to this could be that the M&A market changed and more recently 
firms seek more growth opportunities and strategic investments. We expect this coefficient to 
yield a positive relationship on bid premia and the size of the acquiring firm. 
Diversified acquisition (Divers): is a dummy variable set to one if the acquisition is 
classified as a diversifying acquisition. We achieve this by comparing the acquirers industry 
to the targets industry using 3-digit sic codes. This is used because premiums are usually 
higher when the acquisition is strategic i.e. the acquirer and target is located in the same 
industry (Officer, 2003; Alexandridis et al. 2013). 
High valuation (Highval): Is a dummy variable set to one if the acquisition is announced 
in a high valuation market; this measure is a control variable and substitute for the activity 
measure. It is measured using monthly-detrended cyclically adjusted P/E-ratio of the S&P 
5003 (Bouwman et al. 2009; Alexandridis et al. 2013). The premiums in high valuation 
markets are lower than elsewhere. The diagram below suggests that high valuation periods 
occur in year 2007, 2011, 2012 and 2013 and will have a dummy variable set to one. 
Altman Z score (lnAltman): It is a measure that investigates the performance of a 
corporation, and is thus favorable to use as a control variable since it captures the condition 
and works like a credit evaluation tool capturing adverse credit risk (Altman, 1968). Bhagat 
(2005) show that firms that are more distressed tend to increase investment after periods of 
negative cash flow explained by revival. This behavior can be explained using Altman Z since 
it is used for investment guidelines and detecting insolvency. Furthermore it is previously 
shown that firms more exposed to volatility hoard more cash as a precautionary motive, than 
firm having greater access to capital markets, thus assessing the present condition of the 
acquiring firm (Denis and Sibilkov, 2009). Altman Z gives an indication of competing usage 
of cash e.g. firms that are more distress needs to hold more cash in order to prevent 
insolvency when volatility is high. Furthermore firms could use cash to pay out dividends, 
pay down debt or distribute it. If a firm has more to do than targeting potential acquisitions 
then they are probably not as eager to overbid. Therefore we use Altman Z as a control 
variable in our premia model. 
                                                
3 Data available at Schiller’s homepage: http://irrationalexuberance.com 
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The model defined below will be our main one and will be applied to a structured using 
cross sectional data set, letting variables vary over cross sectional units: 
Bidpremia = α + β!Excess  cash + β!lnMRAS + β!lnMRTS + β!Divers + β!Highval +   β!lnAltman                                                                   2  
3.5.3 Private deal model 
The private deals we will study by summing up the total amount spent on private acquisitions 
for each company each year, we will then use a regression model to try to explain our second 
hypothesis by investigating if firms with excess cash spend more on private acquisitions. For 
private acquisitions there are no premium prices available since there is no stock price to 
measure from, and there exists a misvaluation problem as explained by Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004). There exists a misvaluation problem in the synergies estimated for an 
acquisition, especially when the transaction is related with stock bids. There is no stock price 
to rely on for private targets and therefore if we would try to evaluate what the premia 
corresponds to, we could have a bias. Therefore we only estimate spending instead of 
premium prices for private targets. Control variables used in previous describe models will be 
included in this method too, and they are described above. 
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3.6 Reliability and validity 
3.6.1 Reliability 
Reliability and validity ensures that the method used and results are applicable to the 
research (Bryman and Bell, 2011). Reliability main task is to guarantee that the results found 
are repeatable in forthcoming studies. To ensure this, the measures have to be stable over 
time, internally reliable and be inter-observer consistent i.e. that variables should measure the 
same concept overtime; they are coherent capturing the same concept and be consistent in 
subjective parts and selections (Bryman and Bell, 2011). In our investigation we have been 
thorough in our measuring of secondary data gathered and in these cases we needed to make 
selections undertaken in previous studies methods e.g. when measuring the high valuation 
market variable we used the same data as in Bouwman et al. (2009), instead of creating our 
own adjusted price to earnings ratio.  
3.6.2 Validity 
Validity on the other hand is concerned that the model used and research design is 
conclusive to capture the explanation in what is being studied (Bryman and Bell, 2011). In 
this study we use appropriate models to find explanation for our hypotheses. Opler et al. 
(1999) model is utilized to measure cash rich firm by accounting for operating cash holdings 
for firms, this method was selected since we could measure it fairly with data gathered from 
Factset© and French homepage. Regarding the Pinkowitz et al. (2013) model that we used to 
investigate excess cash and its affect on bid premia, we included as many control variables as 
available to us to be consistent with the measuring methodology. The internal validity is not 
important since we include independent explanatory variables that have been utilized in 
previous research papers, thus fulfilling requirements of face validity (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). Since we are not investigating any relationships to do with private acquiring firms or 
competition, we have dropped the variables associated with these from the original model.  
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4. Empirical Findings 
This section will present our empirical findings of our study into the relationship between 
excess cash and bid premia by comparing and contrasting the different outcomes for current 
and dropped firms sample. The statistical results are also illustrated 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
4.1.2 Current sample	   
Table 4.1 Jarque-Bera test of current sample 
 
 
From The Jarque-Bera test above we can see that the sample does not display normal 
distribution but rather excess kurtosis and right skewness. The histogram shows a probability 
density function for a fat-tailed distribution i.e. displaying leptokurtosis. The kurtosis is 
affected by the fact that we have a considerable amount of firms holding excess cash. 
This non-normality is caused by a few extreme positive premia values and by the fact that 
we have a considerable amount of firms holding excess cash. As our sample size contains all 
the relevant data we require, it is not possible to increase our sample size in order to gain 
normal distribution as stated by central limit theorem (Rosenblatt, 1956). Furthermore, as our 
sample contains a lot of negative values, it is not able to log our values in order to observe 
normal distribution. The skewness is mostly due to a large variation in cash holdings. The 
excess cash is the actual cash holdings minus predicted cash holdings, and this can yield 
negative values, since predicted cash holdings can be larger then the actual cash holdings of 
the firm. In the sample there are a few observation having very negative excess cash and this 
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is the reason for negative skewness. This could be solved using natural logarithm to compress 
the sample, though this would remove a considerable amount of values and bias our data 
sample. The kurtosis is affected by the fact that we have a considerable amount of firms 
holding excess cash. 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of current sample 
	  Descriptive	  statistics	  of	  current	  sample	  (premia	  model)	  
Variable	   lnMRTS	   lnMRAS	   lnMB	   lnAltman	   Highvalue	   Excess	  cash	   Divers	  
Mean	   0.8802	   4.1377	   0.9412	   2.1312	   0.4106	   0.0075	   0.1511	  
Median	   0.8127	   4.1001	   0.8741	   1.8842	   0.0000	   0.0210	   0.0000	  
Max	   5.2141	   7.0015	   3.3824	   9.0633	   1.0000	   1.0694	   1.0000	  
Min	   -­‐3.2314	   0.7966	   -­‐0.1188	   -­‐4.7464	   0.0000	   -­‐9.6346	   0.0000	  
Std.	  Dev.	   1.4472	   1.2687	   0.5700	   1.2775	   0.4926	   0.7387	   0.3586	  
Skewness	   0.2633	   -­‐0.0070	   1.0770	   0.9577	   0.3635	   -­‐10.7171	   1.9480	  
Kurtosis	   2.8204	   2.2833	   5.0233	   7.9039	   1.1322	   132.0975	   4.7947	  
Analyzing the descriptive statistics of our independent variables in the table above we see 
from the kurtosis and skewness that the overall fit is consistent, except the excess cash 
variable, which represents the values from the Opler et al. (1999) model. An lnMRTS figure is 
given in a ratio and average 0.88 and exhibits a median of 0.81 implying evenly and closely 
distributed data points. lnMRAS, also given as a ratio, is more closely distributed with fewer 
outliers data points mean value of 4.13 and median value of 4.10. lnMB also displays similar 
characteristics as lnMRAS, with its mean, 0.94, and median, 0.87. We observe that the mean 
and median values, 2.13 and 1.88 respectively, for lnAltman are above the critical value of 
1.8. Anything below this critical value tells us a firm is in financial distress (Altman, 1968). 
Excess cash appears to be well distributed with respective mean-median ratios of 0.049 - 
0.0207. Outliers in the sample will influence this result. Both the highvalue and diversifying 
variables are dummy variables in our regression but still supply us with useful information. 
Observing the high value variable we can see that in our sample 41% of acquisitions are 
undertaken in high valued markets and 15.1% of acquisitions of a diversifying nature. 
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Table 4.3 Correlation matrix of current sample 
Correlation	  matrix	  for	  premia	  model	  of	  current	  sample	  
Variable	   lnMRTS	   lnMRAS	   lnMB	   lnAltman	   Highvalue	   Excess	  cash	   Divers	  
lnMRTS	   1	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
lnMRAS	   0,1889	   1	   	   	   	   	   	  
lnMB	   -­‐0,0200	   0,1437	   1	   	   	   	   	  
lnAltman	   -­‐0,0419	   -­‐0,0155	   0,4494	   1	   	   	   	  
Highvalue	   0,0008	   -­‐0,0528	   0,0818	   -­‐0,1251	   1	   	   	  
Excess	  cash	   -­‐0,0378	   0,0162	   -­‐0,2609	   -­‐0,0394	   -­‐0,0017	   1	   	  
Divers	   -­‐0,1141	   0,0364	   -­‐0,0736	   -­‐0,0317	   0,0338	   0,0330	   1	  
By setting up a covariance matrix of the independent variables, we can see that the highest 
correlation is between lnAltman and lnMB. However as the correlation is below 0.8, we can 
state that there is no multicollinearity present between them or in this sample. Therefore there 
are no severe disturbances by running the regression if we include both variables (Brooks, 
2008).  
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4.1.2 Dropped sample 
Table 4.4 Jarque-Bera test of dropped sample 
 
When run the Jarque-Bera test above we expect that much of the observations and 
explanations for the current sample will apply here. The sample does not display normal 
distribution but rather excess kurtosis and right skewness. The histogram shows a probability 
density function for a fat-tailed distribution i.e. displaying leptokurtosis. This non-normality is 
again caused by a few extreme positive premia values and as our sample size contains all the 
relevant data we require, it is not possible to increase our sample size in order to gain normal 
distribution as stated by central limit theorem (Rosenblatt, 1956). Furthermore, as our sample 
contains a lot of negative values, it is not able to log our values in order to observe normal 
distribution. 
Table 4.5 Descriptive statistics of dropped sample 
Descriptive	  statistics	  of	  dropped	  sample	  (premia	  model)	  
Variable	   lnMRTS	   lnMRAS	   lnMB	   lnAltman	   Highvalue	   Excess	  cash	   Divers	  
Mean	   0,8723	   4,0929	   0,8958	   2,1448	   0,4005	   0,0494	   0,1529	  
Median	   0,7837	   4,0512	   0,8663	   1,8920	   0,0000	   0,0207	   0,0000	  
Max	   5,2141	   7,0015	   3,3824	   9,0633	   1,0000	   1,2032	   1,0000	  
Min	   -­‐3,2314	   0,7966	   -­‐1,4818	   -­‐4,7464	   0,0000	   -­‐4,6689	   0,0000	  
Std.	  Dev.	   1,4477	   1,2722	   0,6263	   1,2682	   0,4906	   0,3505	   0,3603	  
Skewness	   0,2527	   0,0381	   0,4238	   0,9582	   0,4062	   -­‐8,0558	   1,9288	  
Kurtosis	   2,8078	   2,2688	   5,1986	   7,8995	   1,1650	   106,6836	   4,7202	  
lnMRTS averages 0.87 and exhibits a median of 0.78 implying evenly and closely 
distributed data points. lnMRAS is more closely distributed with fewer outliers data points 
mean value of 4.09 and median value of 4.05. lnMB also display similar characteristics as 
lnMRAS, with its mean, 0.89, and median, 0.86. We observe that the mean and median values, 
2.14 and 1.89 respectively, for lnAltman are above the critical value of 1.8. Excess cash 
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appears to be well distributed with respective mean-median ratios of 0.049 – 0.0207. Outliers 
in the sample will influence this result. Observing the high value variable we can see that in 
our sample 49% of acquisitions are undertaken in high valued markets and 15.3% of 
acquisitions of a diversifying nature. 
Table 4.6 Correlation matrix of dropped sample 
Correlation	  matrix	  for	  premia	  model	  of	  dropped	  sample	  
Variable	   lnMRTS	   lnMRAS	   lnMB	   lnAltman	   Highvalue	   Excess	  cash	   Divers	  
lnMRTS	   1	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
lnMRAS	   0,1878	   1	   	   	   	   	   	  
lnMB	   -­‐0,0052	   0,1948	   1	   	   	   	   	  
lnAltman	   -­‐0,0419	   -­‐0,0459	   0,4226	   1	   	   	   	  
Highvalue	   -­‐0,0015	   -­‐0,0297	   0,1095	   -­‐0,1178	   1	   	   	  
Excess	  cash	   -­‐0,0001	   0,0456	   -­‐0,0265	   0,0657	   0,0129	   1	   	  
Divers	   -­‐0,1035	   -­‐0,0241	   -­‐0,0706	   -­‐0,0775	   -­‐0,0169	   0,0016	   1	  
We can see that the highest correlation is between lnAltman and lnMB. However as the 
correlation is below 0.8, we can state that there is no multicollinearity present between them 
or in this sample. 
4.1.3 Comparison of models 
When we compare our two samples, our current sample has higher mean values across the 
board except for the variables lnAltman, excess cash and diversified. 
On average, firms in our dropped sample hold much higher levels of excess cash. This is a 
function of us accounting for survivorship bias. The normal cash holdings in the current 
sample are high due to large cash holdings being very common in largest US corporations 
which S&P 500 displays (Federal Reserve, St. Louis, 2007). This then distorts our predicted 
cash holdings data we the model yields higher predicted values. In the dropped samples we 
adjust for survivorship bias and so we obtain lower predicted cash holdings due to the fact 
that these dropped firms have less cash holdings giving us unbiased objective picture of the 
S&P 500 in our analyzed time period. Consequently the sample has less outlier, observed in 
our max and min values, which is positive, as we do not want large variations in our sample.  
We also observe that in our dropped sample that the acquisitions are slightly more 
diversified and to be in better financial health i.e. slightly higher lnAltman. This will be a 
function of including more deals due to an increase in number of firms in dropped sample. 
When we compare both correlation matrixes although most of the values change between 
the two samples, the differences are not substantial. However what is of interest is that in 
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some relationships there is a change in signs, showing that the variables have shifted from a 
positive correlation to negative correlation: high value’s correlation to excess cash and 
diversifying; excess cash relationship to lnAltman. But in both matrixes there is no 
multicollinearity. 
4.1.4	  Private	  acquisition	  model	  
 
From the Jarque-Bera test above we see a fairly normal distributed sample of the private 
spend model. However, there is excess skewness in the sample, also the histogram shows 
somewhat leptokurtic outcomes. 
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4.2 Regression Results 
4.2.1 Current sample regression analysis 
Table 4.7 Current sample regression analysis of public M&A 
Current	  sample	  regression	  analysis	  of	  public	  M&A	  
Variables	   	   Bidpremia30	   Bidpremia304	  
Constant	   	   0,4148	   	   0,3193	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Excess	  cash	   	   0,0223	   	   0,0335	  
	   	   	   0,3648	   	   0,0518d	  
lnMRTS	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0,0357	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,0000a	  
lnMRAS	   	   	   	   	   0,0235	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,0190c	  
lnMB	   	   	   	   	   0,0709	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,0061a	  
Divers	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0,0637	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,0643d	  
Highvalue	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0,0415	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,1024	  
lnAltman	   	   	   	   -­‐0,0162	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,1403	  
N	   	   	   453	   	   397	  
R2	  adj	   	   	   -­‐0,0004	   	   0,0702	  
 BIdpremia30 = 0,3193 + 0,0335Excess  cash + −0,0357lnMRTS + 0,0235lnMRAS + 0,0709lnMB + −0,0637Divers+ −0,0415Highvalue + −0,0162lnAltman 
The regression for the current sample above shows the confirmation of Alexandridis et al. 
(2013) and Moeller et al. (2004) findings that the less the targets size the higher the bid 
premia. Furthermore the lnMRAS is a significant explanation in the bid premium for firms in 
acquisition, the interpretations is that the larger the firm relative the median market valuation 
the higher the premium price on a target, which is in line with Alexandridis et al. (2013) 
findings. The market to book control variables also confirm the findings of Alexandridis et al. 
(2013) study. 
Regarding our main variable excess cash, we can see an economical impact on bid premia 
in this regression model suggesting that there exists an explanation of our hypothesis in the 
bid premium for target acquisitions. Interpretation is that the more excess cash firms hold the 
more likely they are in overbidding. Furthermore we find an economical explanation for if the 
                                                
4 P-values are bold italics reported in bracket: a, b, c and d, which represented 0,1 %, 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance level. 
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acquisition is of diversifying character or not, interpretation is that if the acquisition is 
diversifying then the acquiring firm is less likely overbidding. 
4.2.2 Dropped sample regression analysis 
Table 4.8 Dropped sample regression analysis of public M&A 
Dropped	  sample	  regression	  analysis	  of	  public	  M&A	  
Variables	   	   Bidpremia30	   Bidpremia305	  
Constant	   	   0,4068	   	   0,3671	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
Excess	  cash	   	   0,0410	   	   0,0750	  
	   	   	   0,3894	   	   0,0313c	  
lnMRTS	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0,0355	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,0000a	  
lnMRAS	   	   	   	   	   0,0206	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,0407c	  
lnMB	   	   	   	   	   0,0418	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,0629d	  
Divers	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0,0790	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,0201c	  
Highvalue	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0,0461	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,0689d	  
lnAltman	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0,0177	  
	   	   	   	   	   0,1054	  
N	   	   	   511	   	   412	  
R2	  adj	   	   	   -­‐0,0004	   	   0,0702	  
 BIdpremia30 = 0,3671 + 0,0750Excess  cash +   −0,0355lnMRTS + 0,0206lnMRAS + 0,0418lnMB + −0,0790Divers+ −0,0461Highvalue + −0,0177lnAltman 
The regression of the dropped sample above shows different outcomes for the variables. 
The model still confirms the findings of Alexandridis et al. (2013) and Moeller et al. (2004) 
regarding the market relative target value. Furthermore the model still confirms the findings 
in Alexandridis et al. (2013) regarding the lnMB and lnMRAS variable. 
The dropped sample regression shows statistical significance for diversified acquisitions, 
which suggest that firms targeting diversifying acquisitions pay lower premia for such targets. 
Furthermore, the model gives an economical explanation to high valuation market. The 
finding is in line with Alexandridis et al. (2013) that acquisitions in high valuation market 
tend to pay less premium prices. The explanation to this is that the target firm is already 
overvalued due to a bullish market sentiment, which makes the acquiring firm adopt a 
conservative approach towards the target. This is due to their reluctance to pay an additional 
                                                
5 P-values are bold italics reported in bracket: a, b, c and d, which represented 0,1 %, 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance level. 
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premia on top of the over valuation. Finally, we see that our main hypothesis is confirmed 
when we account for dropped firms and bypass survivorship bias. The excess cash variable is 
statistically significant and suggests that firms holding more excess cash are likely to be 
overbidding for target acquisitions. 
4.2.3 Dropped sample interaction regression analysis 
Table 4.9 Dropped sample interaction analysis of M&A 
Interaction	  analysis	  of	  year	  on	  dropped	  sample	  M&A	  
Variable	   	   Bidpremia30	   P-­‐value6	  
Constant	   	   0,3828	   0,0000	  
Excess	  cash	   	   0,3943	   0,0262c	  
lnMRTS	   	   	   -­‐0,0385	   0,0000a	  
lnMRAS	   	   	   0,0188	   0,0672d	  
Divers	   	   	   -­‐0,0825	   0,0167c	  
Highvalue	   	   	   -­‐0,0503	   0,0617d	  
lnMB	   	   	   0,0386	   0,1053	  
lnAltman	   	   -­‐0,0188	   0,0912d	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2003	   	   -­‐0,4156	   0,1528	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2004	   -­‐0,1379	   0,6559	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2005	   -­‐0,3255	   0,0904d	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2006	   	   -­‐0,4688	   0,0446c	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2007	   	   -­‐0,3155	   0,2489	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2008	   -­‐0,3279	   0,4654	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2009	   -­‐0,2289	   0,5384	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2010	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2011	   -­‐0,1571	   0,5351	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2012	   -­‐0,3289	   0,0744d	  
Excess	  cash	  ×	  2013	   	   -­‐0,4655	   0,0531d	  
N	   	   	   	   412	  
R2	  adj	   	   	   	   0,0574	  
Interaction analysis gives us the possibility to analyze if one explanatory variable 
influences the effect of another explanatory variable on the dependent variables. In order to 
gauge whether excess cash was a critical explanatory variable influencing acquisition premia 
in certain years, we took our main dropped sample regression and included interaction terms 
between excess cash and bid premia. The information provided would be helpful, as we 
would expect excess cash to play a smaller role in global financial crisis years (2008-2010) 
and 6th M&A wave year (2003-2007). This is because during the 6th wave years, the market 
was relatively high valued; hence the bid premia paid would have been relatively low. As for 
the GFC years, we would expect the premia to be quite low due to fire sales by firms and also 
the lack of targets leading to low M&A activities.   
                                                
6 P-values are bold italics reported in bracket: a, b, c and d, which represented 0,1 %, 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance level. 
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The table above shows the interaction of excess cash and the year analyzed in our study. 
As we can see there are four periods in the interaction analysis showing excess cash 
influencing the effect of the period on the bid premium in that year. The period 2005, 2012 
and 2013 is economically significant, and 2006 is statistically significant. The interpretation 
of the coefficients is that excess cash had substantial impact on the considered time period in 
relation to bid premiums. All coefficients are negative, suggesting that there is a negative 
relationship between bid premiums in those periods and excess cash. These years fall within 
the sixth merger wave, were acquirers paid lower premium. Boston Consulting Groups report 
“Riding the next wave in M&A” from 2011 on pp. 10 offers some explanation for this 
relationship. It states based on its research that premiums in 2005 and 2006 were substantially 
less than the average long-term premiums at 36%. Furthermore, Alexandridis et al. (2012) 
shows that in this time period acquirers were less over-optimistic and offered significantly 
lower premiums that can explain the negative impact on premiums. As we stated in the 
introduction section, cash holdings were at an all time high in 2013, yet bid premia was at an 
18 year low. This could offer an explanation for the significant results in 2013. 
4.2.4	  Dropped	  sample	  private	  acquisitions	  
Table 4.10 Dropped sample private acquisitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This model is a sub test to our main hypothesis. This is conducted in order to give further 
explanation to the outcomes, which has been presented previously.  Form the model we can 
conclude that size is of significant matter and the interpretation is that the larger the firm, the 
more it will spend on private acquisitions. Furthermore, the model shows confirmation on our 
                                                
7 P-values are bold italics reported in bracket: a, b, c and d, which represented 0,1 %, 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance level. 
Spend	  private	  model	  of	  dropped	  sample	  
Variable	   	  	   Coefficient	  	   P-­‐value7	  
C	   	  	   1,8535	   	  	  
Excess	  cash	   	  	   -­‐0,0200	   0,0435c	  
Size	   	  	   0,8442	   0,0000a	  
Cash	  flow	   	  	   0,2460	   0,4236	  
Leverage	   	  	   -­‐0,0797	   0,5235	  
Dividends	   	  	   0,0388	   0,6268	  
N	   	  	   1491	   	  	  
R2	  adj	   	  	   0,1026	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main hypothesis, though the coefficient in the model is negative suggesting that the less 
excess cash a firm has the more it will spend on acquiring private targets. The negative 
coefficient can be explained by the fact that firms that hold less excess cash are more likely to 
spend on private strategic targets, since due to less cash holdings they do not have the funds to 
acquire larger public targets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do firms with excess cash pay higher premia?  
 49 
5. Data Interpretation and Discussion 
This section will discuss our empirical findings on our main dataset by mainly focusing on the 
impact of excess cash on bid premia in our model. We will also discuss what this mean, how 
the results are valuable and why. 
The present study was designed to evaluate the effects of excess cash holding on bid 
premia. The results showed that when adjusting for survivorship bias in our sample, bid 
premia increases as excess cash increases. In our sub-study of spending in the private space, 
our results painted a different picture. As excess cash increases, the amount spent on 
acquiring private targets decreases. 
5.1 Dropped sample model - interpretation 
Model 1 in table 4.8 displays the results when we regress our variable of interest, excess 
cash, on the bid premia 30-days before the announcement. Excess cash has a coefficient of 
0.0410 and it is insignificant at 0.05 percent. In Model 2, we add in other control variables 
alongside our variable of interest. We can see that despite controlling for other variables, 
excess cash is statistically significant at 0.05 level, with a lower p-value of 0.0313. For every 
unit increase in excess cash we see a 0.0750 percent increase in bid premia. In this regression, 
this is the second largest coefficient. 
Interestingly when we observe lnMRTS, the natural logarithm of market relative target size 
that measures the size of the target, we see that it is significant at 0.00 percent level. Its 
relationship to bid premia though is negative as we observe a negative coefficient of -0.0355. 
Therefore, every unit increase in the size of the target leads to reduction in the bid premia by 
0.0355 percent. 
On the other hand when we observe lnMRAS, the natural logarithm of market relative 
acquirer size that measures the size of the acquirer, we can see that it is statistically significant 
at 0.05 percent level. Similar to excess cash, the size of the acquirer has a positive relationship 
with the bid premia, in that for every unit increase in the acquirer’s size there is a 0.0206 
percent increase in the bid premia. 
The diversifying variable is a dummy variable measuring if an acquisition is a diversifying 
in nature. We can observe from the results that diversifying acquisitions have a negative 
effect on bid premia, in that when a deal is of this nature, bid premia decreases by 0.0790. The 
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variable is statistically significant at 0.05 level. Moreover, it obtained the largest coefficient in 
our model. 
lnMB, the natural logarithm of market to book that measures the financial valuation and 
also the potential investment opportunities of a firm, is economically significant on 0.1 
percent level. It obtained a coefficient of 0.0418, meaning that it has a positive relationship 
with bid premia, our dependent variable. For every unit increase in lnMB, there will be a 
0.0407 percent increase in our dependent variable, bid premia. 
Highvalue is our second dummy variable in this model and it measures whether or not the 
acquisition occurred in a high valued market i.e. overvalued market. This variable has a 
negative relationship with bid premia, in that if an acquisition takes place in a high valued 
market its bid premia will decrease by -0.0461 percent. This variable is economically 
significant at a 0.1 level, with a p-value of 0.0689. 
5.2 Dropped sample interaction model - Interpretation 
Table 4.9 displays our independent variables alongside our interaction terms between 
excess cash and each year in our observed time period. We do this to investigate the effect 
that excess cash has on bid premia in each year. In this model all our independent variables 
from the model above maintain their negative or positive relationship with bid premia. 
Observing the model we can see that the interaction between excess cash and 2010 is missing, 
this is due to an E-views error.  
Looking at the interactions we see that in years 2005, 2006, 2012, 2013, excess cash has a 
negative influence in relation to bid premia in these years. In 2005, for every unit change in 
excess cash we see a -0.3255 percent decrease in bid premia in that year. The variable is 
economically significant at 0.1 percent level. In 2006, for every unit change in excess cash we 
see a -0.4468 percent decrease in bid premia in that year. In 2012, for every unit change in 
excess cash we observe a -0.3289 decrease in bid premium in that year. This variable is 
economically significant at 0.1 percent level. Finally, in 2013, for every unit change in excess 
cash we observe a -0.4655 decrease in bid premium in that year. This variable is economically 
significant at 0.1 percent level. ‘ 
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5.3 Dropped sample spend model – Interpretation 
In table 4.10 we observe the results for our secondary hypothesis, with the amount of 
money spent on private acquisitions by dropped firms as our dependent variable. 
In this Model, we add in other control variables alongside our variable of interest. We can 
see that despite controlling for other variables, excess cash is still statistically significant at 
0.05 level, with a lower coefficient of 0.0435. For every unit increase in excess cash we see a 
0.0200 percent decrease in the amount spent on private deals.  
Interestingly Size, a measurement of the size of the acquiring firm similar to lnMRAS, is 
the only significant independent variable. It is significant on a 0.00 basis. Size has a positive 
relationship with the amount of money spent on private acquisitions, in that with every unit 
increase of size there is a 0.8442 percent rise in the amount of money spent on private 
acquisitions 
5.4 Robustness of the regression 
As in line with most empirical studies, a “robustness check” is needed in order to examine 
how our core regression coefficient estimates behave when we make modifications to our 
model. As we focused on our dropped sample, we used our current sample and the results 
obtained from the regression as a robustness test. The results for this can be seen in table 4.7. 
From this we can observe that the signs and magnitudes in this regression are similar to that 
of our dropped sample. This is evidence that the estimated regression coefficients in our 
dropped sample can be reliably interpreted as the true causal effects of the associated variable 
and our model is both plausible and robust. 
5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1	  Dropped	  sample	  
The main regression presented in table 4.8 gives explanation to the main hypothesis of this 
study formulate in the literature section: The larger a firms excess cash holdings the higher 
the premia it will pay over and above the average for a target. The result suggests that the 
more excess cash a firm holds, the more it is that they overpay for the target firm. This is in 
line with Malmendier and Tate (2005) statement that CEO’s having access to more internal 
funds overinvests. We can conclude that in our dataset, US companies in the S&P 500 excess 
cash holdings have a positive influence on the bid premia they pay to acquire a target. The 
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reason for this we resolved is down to behavioral factors centered on an overconfidence bias. 
When faced with an investment opportunity, CEO’s buoyant on the power they wield at the 
top of corporate pyramid, and riding on the wave of overconfidence in their “above-average” 
abilities, see this as a way to flex their financial muscle. The larger the muscle behind the 
CEO, the more they are willing and expected to spend the excess cash available in order to 
acquire the right target. This raise a problem from a shareholders point of view since CEO 
main objectives is to maximize the value of the firm. 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) explains four different CEO indictors for overbidding; the 
recent performance of the firm, which comes back to the free cash flow theory, if fixed claims 
is limited on cash flows this, can yield a hubris effect, which explains the potential 
overpayment. Another important factor is the medias coverage of CEO; they are often related 
to heroics and an important factor in the social context explained as “larger then life”. This 
relationship with media gives extraction to CEO’s self importance and increases the 
likelihood of hubris and contests for M&A’s 
Roll (1986) backs up Hayward and Hambrick (1997) statement saying that bidding firms 
infected by hubris simply pay too much for their targets, and cannot extract synergy values 
matching payments. The pride in the CEO’s status is an important factor considering potential 
overbidding, especially if boards are more passive and consists of many inside directors. 
Our study similarly found that even though excess cash was a significant variable 
influencing the bid premia, the size of the target company was in fact the most significant 
variable in the model (p-value of 0.000). This finding is in agreement with Alexandridis et al. 
(2013) results. Furthermore, results show a negative relationship between the target firms size 
and bid premia, which falls in line with the findings of Moeller et al. (2004), Dong et al. 
(2006), Alexandridis et al. (2013).  As the target size increases, the bid premia paid to the 
acquired will decrease. This rational is plausible, as with a bigger target, the harder and longer 
it will take to extract potential synergies needed to make the takeover successful. Furthermore, 
the spotlight that CEO’s will be under will be greater when involving larger targets and 
therefore force them to take actions which could further harm any possible synergy 
extractions. 
The size of the acquiring firm has the opposite affect to the size of the target firm, in that 
as the acquiring firm size increases the bid premia increases also. When a firm is bigger, the 
target company will most likely try to extract as much of a premia as possible due to the fact 
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that they know the firm can afford to pay up. On the other hand, a bigger firm wanting to 
complete a deal quickly, will come in with an initial bid that composes of a high bid premia in 
order to entice a quick settlement. This variable also yielded statistically significance. 
Observing our results we can see that the diversifying dummy variable, that if a firm was 
to undertake a diversifying acquisition it would pay a lower bid premium. Again this is not 
surprising given that entering into a new industry or sector will mean it will be harder to 
extract potential synergies due to lack of expertise. Therefore the acquiring firm will offer 
lower premia, as the synergies are smaller. This variable was statistically significant.  
On an economically significant level, our models show that if the acquisition took place in 
a high valuation market, it would yield a lower bid premia paid. This is in line with the 
findings of Bouwman et al. (2009); why would a company knowing the target is over-valued 
pay a high premium on top of this. Potential synergies if extracted might not still make up for 
the over paid premium if the deal was executed.  
Market to book variable is a proxy for investment opportunities and valuation of a firm. It 
is shown in our model that this has a positive correlation with bid premia on an economically 
significant level. If an acquiring firm is deemed to have a high valuation, the market believes 
that it has bright future and as such this could lead to the firm believing in its own hype. In 
doing this they believe that they will be able to extract enough potential synergies from 
acquisitions to deem it successful. Therefore when bidding for attractive target companies, 
they will overbid in order to win, experiencing the winner’s curse phenomenon. 
5.5.2	  Dropped	  sample	  interaction	  model	  
The dropped sample interaction model method is less about the excess cash and gives more 
explanation to the valuation cycle, which has been covered by many researchers in this field 
of study. The interaction outputs show that the years important are: 2005, 2006, 2012 and 
2013. 2005 and 2006 is explained by the sixth merger wave covered in Alexandridis et al. 
(2012). They show that acquirers in this period paid less premium than the long term mean 
value. This is due to the fact that in high value periods, such as the sixth merger wave, firms 
pay lower premia (Alexandridis et al, 2013). 
5.5.3	  Dropped	  sample	  spend	  model	  
The results from this model were at first surprising, as they disproved our hypothesis that 
the more excess cash a firm holds the more it will spend on private acquisitions. The basis of 
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hypothesis was built upon the notion that a firm has more excess cash it would make more 
acquisitions irrespective of private or public arena. Therefore we shall discuss the meaning 
and explanation of these findings.  
As a firm’s excess cash increases they are more open to undertaking a larger deal, which 
could bring more synergies, increase product mix and help penetrate new markets (Hayward 
and Hambrick, 1997). As a result they reduce their spending in the private arena, in order to 
develop a big enough war chest to spend in acquiring a public target. 
Looking at the model, excess cash is much less important than the size of the firm when it 
comes to how much is spent on private acquisitions. We knew that the size of the acquirer 
would be a big influence on our dependent variable but did not expect the coefficient to be so 
big and also at a significance level of 0.00.  When you take into account how big our sample 
is, over 2000 deals, it is further surprising that we obtained such a result. Interpreting this we 
can say that the bigger the firm the more it spends on deals. The private arena is one where 
bigger firms can go to acquire strategic bolts on to fortify their business, where overconfident 
CEO’s can go to grow their empire (Malmendier and Tate 2005 paper) and acquire firms who 
are creating disruptive technologies. Though they may pay higher bid premia than for public 
targets (Alexandridis et al, 2013)., acquiring a smaller private firm is a cheaper alternative to 
acquiring a public target as well more likely to offer higher returns. This is due to the fact that 
it is easier to extract synergies from smaller targets than larger targets (Alexandridis et al, 
2013).  
6. Conclusion 
This overall aim of this paper has been to investigate the relationship between excess cash 
holdings and bid premia. In particular, when trying to acquire a potential target, is there a 
positive relationship between the bid premia an acquiring firm pays and the acquiring firm’s 
excess cash holdings. The study also sought to investigate the effect of excess cash holdings 
on spending on private acquisitions. Both bid premiums and excess cash holdings are 
important fields of study in finance with a plethora of empirical papers on the subjects but the 
general theoretical literature surrounding this particular topic is very minimal. As such we 
were motivated to undertake an empirical study in order to add to the narrow spectrum of 
existing studies and try to answer the question, if a firm has more excess cash on their balance 
sheet, will they pay a higher premia? 
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A major inspiration behind this study was the below quote from Malmendier and Tate 2005 
paper, “Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction” had any 
substance behind it: 
 “Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment 
projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest 
when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they 
require external financing”. 
By undertaking this study we hoped to empirically prove or disapprove this statement. 
Therefore, excess cash is a proxy for “abundant internal funds” and bid premia a proxy for 
“overinvestment”. 
As we aimed to be submit as objective a paper as possible, we utilized a dropped sample as 
our main dataset in order to bypass any survivorship bias associated with our sample set, S&P 
500 in the period 2003-2013. Though this study is not an extension of their papers, we have 
utilized models outlined in Opler’s (1999) Alexandridis, et al. (2013) research papers. In their 
respective papers the authors outlined an excess cash model and bid premia model. In Opler’s 
excess cash model, the natural logarithm of cash holdings is the dependent variable and it was 
controlled by a number of independent variables. All independent variables were significant 
in our model bar our working capital variable. This is due to the small significance this 
variable has in real world situations in predicting future cash flows. The dependent variable in 
the aforementioned model then became an independent variable in our version of 
Alexandridis et al. (2013) bid premia model. In this model, the bid premia from our dropped 
firm dataset was the dependent variable and it was also controlled for by a number of 
independent variables. As stated this model was a slight variation of the original model, as we 
did not take into account market activity or competition variables.  
Our results from the bid premia model indicated that there is a positive relationship between 
excess cash holdings and bid premia paid in an acquisition of a target company. In doing this 
it proved our main hypothesis and offered a simple answer to our simple question. In addition, 
the results obtained in relation to our independent variables supported results obtained in 
several others studies that analyze the impact of these independent variables on bid premiums. 
Therefore our study acts as pseudo-robustness test for these studies and offer more evidence 
that their analysis is correct. 
When we observed the spend model, in relation to our second hypothesis, we saw that excess 
cash was statistically significant. But unlike the bid premia model, our hypothesis was proven 
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wrong. Excess cash has a negative relationship with the amount of money spent on private 
deals. We interpreted this as saying that if firm’s excess cash holdings increase, they will 
spend less on private deals and be more likely to undertake a transaction in the public arena. 
In general, our study offers the basis on which further studies into this topic can be based on 
and compared. Furthermore our study can be used in relation to a spectrum of topics from the 
behavioral affect of cash holdings on CEO’s decision making to Jensen’s free cash flow 
problem to even the reasons for holding cash. Although a simple concept lies at the heart of 
this study, many of the results verify findings from across several different fields of finance. 
This therefore points towards a study, which is reliable due to its dataset (S&P 500) that is 
adjusted for survivorship bias and valid due to how established research and models upon 
which form its foundations.    
 In answering the questions set out by our paper, we have come to the conclusion that excess 
cash holdings, a powerful and useful resource for any top executive in trying to create 
shareholder value, in the hands of an overconfident CEO can exacerbate irrational behavior. It 
is this irrational behavior based perhaps on hubris, which leads to bid premia being paid out. 
When a CEO has more excess cash holdings they are more likely to enter the public arena 
looking for that career-defining, front page transaction than perhaps build value slowly 
through dipping into the private market and acquiring strategic targets that will get lost in the 
abundance of financial news stories. With the amount of traction that the interest in the topic 
of firms sitting on a mountain of excess cash is getting, we feel that this is an area of research 
that will receive increased attention over the coming years. As such we feel that our study and 
the results surrounding the positive effect of excess cash holdings on bid premia, can add a 
certain dimension to this relative infantile research area.  
6.2 Proposals for Further Research  
Concerning the study’s research focus, it is pointed out that it remains highly under 
researched and therefore offers plenty of space for future scrutiny. 
Although we selected our variables after much examination of previous literature, there is 
still a possibility that different variables deemed to be more suitable for future research could 
be included. We include variables that would distinguish between pure acquisitions and 
mergers. By controlling for this we can see if excess cash has any affect on the different 
restructuring events. In relation to takeovers, we could also control for hostile vs. friendly 
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takeovers and its impact on bid premia. In our sample we did not control for competition or 
bidding wars, which can have an impact on bid premia. In future studies we would include a 
variable to measure and control for this. In our sample we did not include a variable to 
account for behavioral factors or the impact of management. As such we would include a 
variable to measure CEO overconfidence or experience of management in place.  
Another suggestion is a focus on a longer time perspective in terms of research period, 
which might reveal relationships that are only pronounced over a longer history of 
acquisitions. We could also incorporate a different price benchmark than the bid – premia 30 
that we utilized. In doing this observation with negative announced premiums could now have 
a positive value.  
Currently the sample is based on S&P 500, which encompasses the largest US firms, 
therefore concentrating our study on a specific geographical location. In future studies, we 
would replicate the studies across different geographical locations and on different indices. If 
not we would just perform the study on one global indices such as S&P 1200.  
We reclassified our data into French industry classification given on French webpage. But 
with such a changing landscape and the introduction of new industries we feel that French 
classification is a bit outdated. Therefore, we would classify the firms using Reuters or Factset 
classifications that will offer broader and more up-to-date industry classifications. We would 
also run an interaction model with excess cash, to see if excess cash influences bid premia in 
certain industries. 
During our data collection phase we collected information on over 2000 private deals. Due 
to a lack of information, we were not able to obtain useful findings. In a further study, we 
would try to collect as much information to private deals. We would also undertake more 
analysis and try to find more relevant control variables to include in this model. Perhaps this 
dataset could play a greater role in a new study with a wider scope.  
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Appendix 1: Total sample 
Total	  sample	  for	  excess	  cash	  and	  premia	  regression	  model	  (excl.	  financial	  and	  utility	  firms)	  
Firm	   Ticker	   French	  Industries	  
3M	  Co	   MMM-­‐US	   Health	  
Abbott	  Laboratories	   ABT-­‐US	   Health	  
AbbVie	  Inc.	   ABBV-­‐US	   Health	  
Abercrombie	  &	  Fitch	  Co.	   ANF-­‐US	   Retail	  
Accenture	  Plc.	   ACN-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Actavis	  PLC	   ACT-­‐US	   Health	  
ADC	  Telecommunications	  Inc.	   ADCT-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Adobe	  Systems	  Incorporated	   ADBE-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
ADT	  Corp	   ADT-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Advanced	  Micro	  Devices,	  Inc.	   AMD-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Agilent	  Technologies	  Inc.	   A-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Air	  Products	  &	  Chemicals,	  Inc.	   APD-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Airgas,	  Inc.	   ARG-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
AK	  Steel	  Holding	  Corporation	   AKS-­‐US	   Steel	  
Akamai	  Technologies,	  Inc.	   AKAM-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Alberto-­‐Culver	  Company	   ACV-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
Alcoa	  Inc.	   AA-­‐US	   Steel	  
Alexion	  Pharmaceuticals,	  Inc.	   ALXN-­‐US	   Health	  
Allegheny	  Technologies	  Incorporated	   ATI-­‐US	   Steel	  
Allegion	  PLC	   ALLE-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Allergan,	  Inc.	   AGN-­‐US	   Health	  
Alliance	  Data	  Systems	  Corporation	   ADS-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Allied	  Waste	  Industries	  LLC	   AW-­‐US	   Other	  
Alpha	  Natural	  Resources,	  Inc.	   ANR-­‐US	   Coal	  
Altera	  Corporation	   ALTR-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Altria	  Group	  Inc.	   MO-­‐US	   Tobacco	  
Amazon.com,	  Inc.	   AMZN-­‐US	   Retail	  
American	  Greetings	  Corporation	   AM-­‐US	   Books	  
AmerisourceBergen	  Corp.	   ABC-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
AMETEK,	  Inc.	   AME-­‐US	   Electrical	  equipment	  
Amgen,	  Inc.	   AMGN-­‐US	   Health	  
Amphenol	  Corporation	   APH-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Anadarko	  Petroleum	  Corporation	   APC-­‐US	   Oil	  
Analog	  Devices,	  Inc.	   ADI-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Anheuser	  Busch	  Inbev	  SA	   BUD-­‐US	   Beer	  
Apache	  Corporation	   APA-­‐US	   Oil	  
Apollo	  Education	  Group	  Inc.	   APOL-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Apple	  Inc.	   AAPL-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Applied	  Biosystems	  Inc.	   ABI.XX1-­‐US	   Health	  
Applied	  Materials,	  Inc.	   AMAT-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Applied	  Micro	  Circuits	  Corporation	   AMCC-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Archer	  Daniels	  Midland	  Company	   ADM-­‐US	   Food	  
Armstrong	  Holdings,	  Inc.	   ACKH-­‐US	   Construction	  
Ashland	  Inc.	   ASH-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
AT&T	  Inc.	   T-­‐US	   Communication	  
AT&T	  Wireless	  Services	   AWE-­‐US	   Communication	  
Autodesk,	  Inc.	   ADSK-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Automatic	  Data	  Processing	   ADP-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
AutoNation,	  Inc.	   AN-­‐US	   Retail	  
AutoZone,	  Inc.	   AZO-­‐US	   Retail	  
Avery	  Dennison	  Corp	   AVY-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
Avon	  Products,	  Inc.	   AVP-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
Baker	  Hughes	  Incorporated	   BHI-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Ball	  Corporation	   BLL-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
Barr	  Pharmaceuticals	  Inc.	   BRL.XX1-­‐US	   Health	  
Barrick	  Gold	  Corporation	  (USA)	   ABX-­‐US	   Mines	  
Bausch	  &	  Lomb	  Inc.	   BOL-­‐US	   Health	  
Baxter	  International	  Inc.	   BAX-­‐US	   Health	  
BEAM	  Inc.	   BEAM-­‐US	   Beer	  
Becton,	  Dickinson	  and	  Co.	   BDX-­‐US	   Health	  
Bed	  Bath	  &	  Beyond	  Inc.	   BBBY-­‐US	   Retail	  
BellSouth	  Corporation	   BLS.XX1-­‐US	   Communication	  
Bemis	  Company,	  Inc.	   BMS-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
Best	  Buy	  Co	  Inc.	   BBY-­‐US	   Retail	  
Bethlehem	  Steel	  Corp.	   BHMSQ-­‐US	   Steel	  
Big	  Lots,	  Inc.	   BIG-­‐US	   Retail	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Biogen	  Idec	  Inc.	   BIIB-­‐US	   Health	  
Biogen,	  Inc.	   BGEN-­‐US	   Health	  
Biomet	  Inc.	   BMET-­‐US	   Health	  
BJ	  Services	  Company	  LLC	   BJS-­‐US	   Oil	  
BMC	  Software,	  Inc.	   BMC-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
BorgWarner	  Inc.	   BWA-­‐US	   Auto	  
Boston	  Scientific	  Corporation	   BSX-­‐US	   Health	  
Briggs	  &	  Stratton	  Corporation	   BGG-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Bristol-­‐Myers	  Squibb	  Co	   BMY-­‐US	   Health	  
Broadcom	  Corporation	   BRCM-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
BroadVision,	  Inc.	   BVSN-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Brown-­‐Forman	  Corporation	   BF.B-­‐US	   Beer	  
Brunswick	  Corporation	   BC-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
C.H.	  Robinson	  Worldwide,	  Inc.	   CHRW-­‐US	   Transportation	  
C.R.	  Bard,	  Inc.	   BCR-­‐US	   Health	  
CA,	  Inc.	   CA-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Cablevision	  Systems	  Corporation	   CVC-­‐US	   Communication	  
Cabot	  Oil	  &	  Gas	  Corporation	   COG-­‐US	   Oil	  
Cameron	  International	  Corporation	   CAM-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Campbell	  Soup	  Company	   CPB-­‐US	   Food	  
Cardinal	  Health	  Inc.	   CAH-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
CareFusion	  Corporation	   CFN-­‐US	   Health	  
Caremark	  Rx,	  Inc.	   CMX-­‐US	   Health	  
CarMax,	  Inc.	   KMX-­‐US	   Retail	  
Carnival	  Corporation	   CCL-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Caterpillar	  Inc.	   CAT-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
CBS	  Corporation	   CBS-­‐US	   Communication	  
Celgene	  Corporation	   CELG-­‐US	   Health	  
Centex	  LLC	   CTX.XX1-­‐US	   Construction	  
CenturyLink,	  Inc.	   CTL-­‐US	   Communication	  
Cephalon,	  Inc.	   CEPH-­‐US	   Health	  
Cerner	  Corporation	   CERN-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
CF	  Industries	  Holdings,	  Inc.	   CF-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Chesapeake	  Energy	  Corporation	   CHK-­‐US	   Oil	  
Chevron	  Corporation	   CVX-­‐US	   Oil	  
Chipotle	  Mexican	  Grill,	  Inc.	   CMG-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
Chiron	  Corporation	   CHIR-­‐US	   Health	  
Cintas	  Corporation	   CTAS-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
Circuit	  City	  Stores	  Inc.	   CCTYQ-­‐US	   Retail	  
Cisco	  Systems,	  Inc.	   CSCO-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Citrix	  Systems,	  Inc.	   CTXS-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Cliffs	  Natural	  Resources	  Inc.	   CLF-­‐US	   Steel	  
Coach,	  Inc.	   COH-­‐US	   Retail	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  Enterprises	  Inc.	   CCE-­‐US	   Food	  
Cognizant	  Technology	  Solutions	  Corp	   CTSH-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Colgate-­‐Palmolive	  Company	   CL-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
Comcast	  Corporation	   CMCSA-­‐US	   Communication	  
Computer	  Sciences	  Corporation	   CSC-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Compuware	  Corporation	   CPWR-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Comverse	  Technology,	  Inc.	   CMVT-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
ConAgra	  Foods	  Inc.	   CAG-­‐US	   Food	  
ConocoPhillips	   COP-­‐US	   Oil	  
CONSOL	  Energy	  Inc.	   CNX-­‐US	   Coal	  
Constellation	  Brands,	  Inc.	   STZ-­‐US	   Beer	  
Cooper	  Industries	   CBE-­‐US	   Electrical	  equipment	  
Cooper	  Tire	  &	  Rubber	  Co	   CTB-­‐US	   Auto	  
Corning	  Incorporated	   GLW-­‐US	   Steel	  
Costco	  Wholesale	  Corporation	   COST-­‐US	   Retail	  
Covidien	  plc.	   COV-­‐US	   Health	  
Crane	  Co.	   CR-­‐US	   Construction	  
Crown	  Castle	  International	  Corp.	   CCI-­‐US	   Communication	  
CSX	  Corporation	   CSX-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Cummins	  Inc.	   CMI-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
CVS	  Caremark	  Corporation	   CVS-­‐US	   Retail	  
D.R.	  Horton,	  Inc.	   DHI-­‐US	   Construction	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   DHR-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Darden	  Restaurants,	  Inc.	   DRI-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
DaVita	  HealthCare	  Partners	  Inc.	   DVA-­‐US	   Health	  
Dean	  Foods	  Co	   DF-­‐US	   Food	  
Deere	  &	  Company	   DE-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Dell	  Inc.	   DELL-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	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Delphi	  Automotive	  PLC	   DLPH-­‐US	   Auto	  
Delta	  Air	  Lines,	  Inc.	   DAL-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Denbury	  Resources	  Inc.	   DNR-­‐US	   Oil	  
DENTSPLY	  International	  Inc.	   XRAY-­‐US	   Health	  
Devon	  Energy	  Corp	   DVN-­‐US	   Oil	  
DeVry	  Education	  Group	  Inc.	   DV-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Diamond	  Offshore	  Drilling	  Inc.	   DO-­‐US	   Oil	  
Dillard's,	  Inc.	   DDS-­‐US	   Retail	  
DIRECTV	   DTV-­‐US	   Communication	  
Discovery	  Communications	  Inc.	   DISCA-­‐US	   Communication	  
Dollar	  General	  Corp.	   DG-­‐US	   Retail	  
Dollar	  Tree,	  Inc.	   DLTR-­‐US	   Retail	  
Dow	  Jones	  &	  Company,	  Inc.	   DJ-­‐US	   Books	  
Dover	  Corp	   DOV-­‐US	   Construction	  
Dr	  Pepper	  Snapple	  Group	  Inc.	   DPS-­‐US	   Food	  
Dun	  &	  Bradstreet	  Corp	   DNB-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
E	  I	  Du	  Pont	  De	  Nemours	  And	  Co	   DD-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Eastman	  Chemical	  Company	   EMN-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Eaton	  Corporation	  PLC	   ETN-­‐US	   Electrical	  equipment	  
eBay	  Inc.	   EBAY-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Ecolab	  Inc.	   ECL-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
Edwards	  Lifesciences	  Corp	   EW-­‐US	   Health	  
Electronic	  Arts	  Inc.	   EA-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Eli	  Lilly	  and	  Co	   LLY-­‐US	   Health	  
Embarq	  Corporation	   EQ-­‐US	   Communication	  
EMC	  Corporation	   EMC-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Emerson	  Electric	  Co.	   EMR-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
ENSCO	  PLC	   ESV-­‐US	   Oil	  
EOG	  Resources	  Inc.	   EOG-­‐US	   Oil	  
Equifax	  Inc.	   EFX-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Estee	  Lauder	  Companies	  Inc.	   EL-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
Expedia	  Inc.	   EXPE-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Expeditors	  International	  of	  Washington	   EXPD-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Express	  Scripts	  Holding	  Co	   ESRX-­‐US	   Retail	  
Exxon	  Mobil	  Corporation	   XOM-­‐US	   Oil	  
F5	  Networks,	  Inc.	   FFIV-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Facebook	  Inc.	   FB-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Family	  Dollar	  Stores,	  Inc.	   FDO-­‐US	   Retail	  
Fastenal	  Company	   FAST-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
FedEx	  Corporation	   FDX-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Fidelity	  National	  Information	  Services	   FIS-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
First	  Solar,	  Inc.	   FSLR-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Fiserv	  Inc.	   FISV-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Fisher	  Scientific	  International	  LLC	   FSH-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Fleetwood	  Enterprises,	  Inc.	   FLTWQ-­‐US	   Auto	  
FLIR	  Systems,	  Inc.	   FLIR-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Flowserve	  Corp	   FLS-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Fluor	  Corporation	  (NEW)	   FLR-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
FMC	  Corp	   FMC-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
FMC	  Technologies,	  Inc.	   FTI-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Ford	  Motor	  Company	   F-­‐US	   Auto	  
Forest	  Laboratories,	  Inc.	   FRX-­‐US	   Health	  
Fossil	  Group	  Inc.	   FOSL-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
Foster	  Wheeler	  AG	   FWLT-­‐US	   Construction	  
Freeport-­‐McMoRan	  Copper	  &	  Gold	  Inc.	   FCX-­‐US	   Mines	  
Freescale	  Semiconductor	  Ltd	   FSL-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Frontier	  Communications	  Corp	   FTR-­‐US	   Communication	  
GameStop	  Corp.	   GME-­‐US	   Retail	  
Gannett	  Co.,	  Inc.	   GCI-­‐US	   Printing	  and	  publishing	  
Garmin	  Ltd.	   GRMN-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Gateway,	  Inc.	   GTW-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
General	  Dynamics	  Corporation	   GD-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   GE-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
General	  Mills,	  Inc.	   GIS-­‐US	   Food	  
General	  Motors	  Company	   GM-­‐US	   Auto	  
Genuine	  Parts	  Company	   GPC-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Genzyme	  Corporation	   GENZ-­‐US	   Health	  
Georgia-­‐Pacific	  Corporation	   GP.XX1-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
Gilead	  Sciences,	  Inc.	   GILD-­‐US	   Health	  
Global	  Crossing	  Ltd	   GLBC-­‐US	   Communication	  
Goodrich	  Corporation	   GR-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	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Google	  Inc.	   GOOG-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Graham	  Holdings	  Co	   GHC-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Great	  Lakes	  Bancorp	  Inc.	   GLK-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Guidant	  LLC	   GDT-­‐US	   Health	  
H	  &	  R	  Block	  Inc.	   HRB-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
H.J.	  Heinz	  Company	   HNZ-­‐US	   Food	  
Halliburton	  Company	   HAL-­‐US	   Oil	  
Harley-­‐Davidson	  Inc.	   HOG-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
Harman	  International	  Industries	  Inc./DE/	   HAR-­‐US	   Games	  
Harris	  Corporation	   HRS-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Hasbro,	  Inc.	   HAS-­‐US	   Games	  
HCA	  Holdings	  Inc.	   HCA-­‐US	   Health	  
Health	  Management	  Associates	  Inc.	   HMA-­‐US	   Health	  
HealthSouth	  Corp	   HLS-­‐US	   Health	  
Helmerich	  &	  Payne,	  Inc.	   HP-­‐US	   Oil	  
Hercules	  Incorporated	   HPC-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Hershey	  Co	   HSY-­‐US	   Food	  
Hess	  Corp.	   HES-­‐US	   Oil	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   HPQ-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Hilton	  Worldwide	  Holdings	  Inc.	   HLT-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
Honeywell	  International	  Inc.	   HON-­‐US	   Auto	  
Hormel	  Foods	  Corp	   HRL-­‐US	   Food	  
Hospira,	  Inc.	   HSP-­‐US	   Health	  
Illinois	  Tool	  Works	  Inc.	   ITW-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Ingersoll-­‐Rand	  PLC	   IR-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Intel	  Corporation	   INTC-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   IBM-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
International	  Flavors	  &	  Fragrances	  Inc.	   IFF-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
International	  Game	  Technology	   IGT-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
International	  Paper	  Company	   IP-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
Interpublic	  Group	  of	  Companies	  Inc.	   IPG-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Intuit	  Inc.	   INTU-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Intuitive	  Surgical,	  Inc.	   ISRG-­‐US	   Health	  
Iron	  Mountain	  Incorporated	   IRM-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Jabil	  Circuit,	  Inc.	   JBL-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Jacobs	  Engineering	  Group	  Inc.	   JEC-­‐US	   Construction	  
JDS	  Uniphase	  Corp	   JDSU-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   JNJ-­‐US	   Health	  
Johnson	  Controls	  Inc.	   JCI-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
Joy	  Global	  Inc.	   JOY-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Juniper	  Networks,	  Inc.	   JNPR-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Kansas	  City	  Southern	   KSU-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Kate	  Spade	  &	  Co	   KATE-­‐US	   Apparel	  
Kellogg	  Company	   K-­‐US	   Food	  
Kimberly	  Clark	  Corp	   KMB-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
KLA-­‐Tencor	  Corporation	   KLAC-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Knight-­‐Ridder,	  Inc.	   KRI-­‐US	   Books	  
Kohl's	  Corporation	   KSS-­‐US	   Retail	  
Kraft	  Foods	  Group	  Inc.	   KRFT-­‐US	   Food	  
L	  Brands	  Inc.	   LB-­‐US	   Retail	  
L-­‐3	  Communications	  Holdings,	  Inc.	   LLL-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Laboratory	  Corp.	  of	  America	  Holdings	   LH-­‐US	   Health	  
Lam	  Research	  Corporation	   LRCX-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Leggett	  &	  Platt,	  Inc.	   LEG-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
Lennar	  Corporation	   LEN-­‐US	   Construction	  
Leucadia	  National	  Corp.	   LUK-­‐US	   Food	  
Lexmark	  International	  Inc.	   LXK-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Linear	  Technology	  Corporation	   LLTC-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Lockheed	  Martin	  Corporation	   LMT-­‐US	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	  
Longs	  Drug	  Stores	  Corp.	   LDG-­‐US	   Retail	  
Lorillard	  Inc.	   LO-­‐US	   Tobacco	  
Louisiana-­‐Pacific	  Corporation	   LPX-­‐US	   Construction	  
Lowe's	  Companies,	  Inc.	   LOW-­‐US	   Retail	  
LSI	  Corp	   LSI-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Lucent	  Technologies	  Inc.	   LU-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
LyondellBasell	  Industries	  NV	   LYB-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Macy's,	  Inc.	   M-­‐US	   Retail	  
Manitowoc	  Company,	  Inc.	   MTW-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Manor	  Care,	  Inc.	   HCR-­‐US	   Health	  
Marathon	  Oil	  Corporation	   MRO-­‐US	   Oil	  
Marathon	  Petroleum	  Corp	   MPC-­‐US	   Oil	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Marriott	  International	  Inc.	   MAR-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
Masco	  Corporation	   MAS-­‐US	   Construction	  
Mastercard	  Inc.	   MA-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Mattel,	  Inc.	   MAT-­‐US	   Games	  
Maxim	  Integrated	  Products	  Inc.	   MXIM-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
McAfee,	  Inc.	   MFE-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
McCormick	  &	  Company,	  Incorporated	   MKC-­‐US	   Food	  
McDermott	  International	   MDR-­‐US	   Construction	  
McDonald's	  Corporation	   MCD-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
McGraw	  Hill	  Financial	  Inc.	   MHFI-­‐US	   Printing	  and	  publishing	  
McKesson	  Corporation	   MCK-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Mead	  Johnson	  Nutrition	  CO	   MJN-­‐US	   Food	  
MeadWestvaco	  Corp.	   MWV-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
Medco	  Health	  Solutions	  Inc.	   MHS-­‐US	   Retail	  
Medimmune	  LLC	   MEDI-­‐US	   Health	  
Medtronic,	  Inc.	   MDT-­‐US	   Health	  
Merck	  &	  Co.,	  Inc.	   MRK-­‐US	   Health	  
MI	  2009	  Inc.	   MZIAQ-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Michael	  Kors	  Holdings	  Ltd	   KORS-­‐US	   Apparel	  
Microchip	  Technology	  Inc.	   MCHP-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Micron	  Technology,	  Inc.	   MU-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Microsoft	  Corporation	   MSFT-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Mohawk	  Industries,	  Inc.	   MHK-­‐US	   Textiles	  
Molex	  Incorporated	   MOLX-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Molson	  Coors	  Brewing	  Company	   TAP-­‐US	   Beer	  
Mondelez	  International	  Inc.	   MDLZ-­‐US	   Food	  
Monsanto	  Company	   MON-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Monster	  Beverage	  Corp	   MNST-­‐US	   Food	  
Monster	  Worldwide,	  Inc.	   MWW-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Moody's	  Corporation	   MCO-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Mosaic	  Co	   MOS-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Motorola	  Solutions	  Inc.	   MSI-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Murphy	  Oil	  Corporation	   MUR-­‐US	   Oil	  
Mylan	  Inc.	   MYL-­‐US	   Health	  
Nabors	  Industries	  Ltd.	   NBR-­‐US	   Oil	  
NACCO	  Industries,	  Inc.	   NC-­‐US	   Auto	  
National-­‐Oilwell	  Varco,	  Inc.	   NOV-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Navistar	  International	  Corp	   NAV-­‐US	   Auto	  
NCR	  Corporation	   NCR-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
NetApp	  Inc.	   NTAP-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Netflix,	  Inc.	   NFLX-­‐US	   Communication	  
Newell	  Rubbermaid	  Inc.	   NWL-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
Newfield	  Exploration	  Co.	   NFX-­‐US	   Oil	  
Newmont	  Mining	  Corp	   NEM-­‐US	   Mines	  
News	  Corp	   NWSA-­‐US	   Printing	  and	  publishing	  
Nextel	  Communications	   NXTL-­‐US	   Communication	  
Nielsen	  Hldg	  NV	   NLSN-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Nike	  Inc.	   NKE-­‐US	   Apparel	  
Noble	  Corporation	  PLC	   NE-­‐US	   Oil	  
Noble	  Energy,	  Inc.	   NBL-­‐US	   Oil	  
Nordstrom,	  Inc.	   JWN-­‐US	   Retail	  
Norfolk	  Southern	  Corp.	   NSC-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Nortel	  Networks	  Corporation	  (USA)	   NRTLQ-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Northrop	  Grumman	  Corporation	   NOC-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Novell,	  Inc.	   NOVL-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Novellus	  Systems,	  Inc.	   NVLS-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Nucor	  Corporation	   NUE-­‐US	   Steel	  
NVIDIA	  Corporation	   NVDA-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Occidental	  Petroleum	  Corporation	   OXY-­‐US	   Oil	  
Office	  Depot	  Inc.	   ODP-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
OfficeMax	  Inc.	   OMX-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Omnicom	  Group	  Inc.	   OMC-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   ORCL-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   ORCL-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
O'Reilly	  Automotive	  Inc.	   ORLY-­‐US	   Retail	  
Owens-­‐Illinois	  Inc.	   OI-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
PACCAR	  Inc.	   PCAR-­‐US	   Auto	  
Pall	  Corporation	   PLL-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Palm	  Inc.	   PALM-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Parker-­‐Hannifin	  Corporation	   PH-­‐US	   Construction	  
Patterson	  Companies,	  Inc.	   PDCO-­‐US	   Wholesale	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Paychex,	  Inc.	   PAYX-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Peabody	  Energy	  Corporation	   BTU-­‐US	   Coal	  
Pentair	  Ltd	   PNR-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
PepsiCo,	  Inc.	   PEP-­‐US	   Food	  
PerkinElmer,	  Inc.	   PKI-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Perrigo	  Company	  PLC	   PRGO-­‐US	   Health	  
Perrigo	  Company	  PLC	   PRGO-­‐US	   Health	  
PetSmart,	  Inc.	   PETM-­‐US	   Retail	  
Pfizer	  Inc.	   PFE-­‐US	   Health	  
Philip	  Morris	  International	  Inc.	   PM-­‐US	   Tobacco	  
Phillips	  66	   PSX-­‐US	   Oil	  
Pioneer	  Natural	  Resources	   PXD-­‐US	   Oil	  
Pitney	  Bowes	  Inc.	   PBI-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Placer	  Dome	  Inc.	  (USA)	   PDG-­‐US	   Mines	  
PMC-­‐Sierra	  Inc.	   PMCS-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Power	  One	  Inc.	   PWER-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
PPG	  Industries,	  Inc.	   PPG-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Praxair,	  Inc.	   PX-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Precision	  Castparts	  Corp.	   PCP-­‐US	   Steel	  
Priceline	  Group	  Inc.	   PCLN-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
PulteGroup,	  Inc.	   PHM-­‐US	   Construction	  
PVH	  Corp	   PVH-­‐US	   Apparel	  
QEP	  Resources	  Inc.	   QEP-­‐US	   Oil	  
QUALCOMM,	  Inc.	   QCOM-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Quanta	  Services	  Inc.	   PWR-­‐US	   Construction	  
Quest	  Diagnostics	  Inc.	   DGX-­‐US	   Health	  
Questar	  Corporation	   STR-­‐US	   Oil	  
Quintiles	  Transnational	  Holdings	  Inc.	   Q-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
RadioShack	  Corporation	   RSH-­‐US	   Retail	  
Ralph	  Lauren	  Corp	   RL-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Range	  Resources	  Corp.	   RRC-­‐US	   Oil	  
Raytheon	  Company	   RTN-­‐US	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	  
Red	  Hat	  Inc.	   RHT-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Reebok	  International	  Ltd.	   RBK-­‐US	   Apparel	  
Regeneron	  Pharmaceuticals	  Inc.	   REGN-­‐US	   Health	  
Republic	  Services,	  Inc.	   RSG-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Reynolds	  American,	  Inc.	   RAI-­‐US	   Tobacco	  
Rite	  Aid	  Corporation	   RAD-­‐US	   Retail	  
Robert	  Half	  International	  Inc.	   RHI-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Rockwell	  Automation	   ROK-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Rockwell	  Collins,	  Inc.	   COL-­‐US	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	  
Rohm	  and	  Haas	  Company	   ROH-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
Roper	  Industries,	  Inc.	   ROP-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Ross	  Stores,	  Inc.	   ROST-­‐US	   Retail	  
Rowan	  Companies	  PLC	   RDC-­‐US	   Oil	  
Ryder	  System,	  Inc.	   R-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Sabre	  Holdings	  Corporation	   TSG-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Safeway	  Inc.	   SWY-­‐US	   Retail	  
salesforce.com,	  Inc.	   CRM-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
SanDisk	  Corporation	   SNDK-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Sanmina	  Corp	   SANM-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Sapient	  Corporation	   SAPE-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Schering-­‐Plough	  Corp	   SGP-­‐US	   Health	  
Schlumberger	  Limited.	   SLB-­‐US	   Oil	  
Scripps	  Networks	  Interactive,	  Inc.	   SNI-­‐US	   Communication	  
Seagate	  Technology	  PLC	   STX-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Sealed	  Air	  Corp	   SEE-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
Sears	  Holdings	  Corp	   SHLD-­‐US	   Retail	  
Service	  Corporation	  International	   SCI-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Sherwin-­‐Williams	  Company	   SHW-­‐US	   Retail	  
Siebel	  Systems,	  Inc.	   SEBL-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Sigma-­‐Aldrich	  Corporation	   SIAL-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Smith	  International,	  Inc.	   SII-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Snap-­‐on	  Incorporated	   SNA-­‐US	   Construction	  
Solectron	  Corporation	   SLR-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Southwest	  Airlines	  Co	   LUV-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Southwestern	  Energy	  Company	   SWN-­‐US	   Oil	  
Sprint	  Corp	   S-­‐US	   Communication	  
St.	  Jude	  Medical,	  Inc.	   STJ-­‐US	   Health	  
Stanley	  Black	  &	  Decker,	  Inc.	   SWK-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Staples,	  Inc.	   SPLS-­‐US	   Retail	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Starbucks	  Corporation	   SBUX-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
Starwood	  Hotels	  &	  Resorts	  Worldwide	  Inc.	   HOT-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
Stericycle	  Inc.	   SRCL-­‐US	   Other	  
Stryker	  Corporation	   SYK-­‐US	   Health	  
Sunoco,	  Inc.	   SUN-­‐US	   Oil	  
SUPERVALU	  INC.	   SVU-­‐US	   Retail	  
Symantec	  Corporation	   SYMC-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
SYSCO	  Corporation	   SYY-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Target	  Corporation	   TGT-­‐US	   Retail	  
TE	  Connectivity	  Ltd	   TEL-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Tektronix,	  Inc.	   TEK-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Tellabs,	  Inc.	   TLAB-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Temple-­‐Inland,	  Inc.	   TIN-­‐US	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	  
Tenet	  Healthcare	  Corp	   THC-­‐US	   Health	  
Teradata	  Corporation	   TDC-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Teradyne,	  Inc.	   TER-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Terex	  Corporation	   TEX-­‐US	   Auto	  
Tesoro	  Corporation	   TSO-­‐US	   Oil	  
Texas	  Instruments	  Incorporated	   TXN-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Textron	  Inc.	   TXT-­‐US	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	  
The	  Boeing	  Company	   BA-­‐US	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	  
The	  Clorox	  Co	   CLX-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
The	  Coca-­‐Cola	  Company	   KO-­‐US	   Food	  
The	  Dow	  Chemical	  Company	   DOW-­‐US	   Chemicals	  
The	  Gap	  Inc.	   GPS-­‐US	   Retail	  
The	  Goodyear	  Tire	  &	  Rubber	  Company	   GT-­‐US	   Auto	  
The	  Home	  Depot,	  Inc.	   HD-­‐US	   Retail	  
The	  J.M.	  Smucker	  Company	   SJM-­‐US	   Food	  
The	  Kroger	  Co.	   KR-­‐US	   Retail	  
The	  New	  York	  Times	  Company	   NYT-­‐US	   Books	  
The	  Pep	  Boys	  -­‐	  Manny,	  Moe	  &	  Jack	   PBY-­‐US	   Retail	  
The	  Procter	  &	  Gamble	  Company	   PG-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
The	  TJX	  Companies,	  Inc.	   TJX-­‐US	   Retail	  
The	  Walt	  Disney	  Company	   DIS-­‐US	   Communication	  
The	  Western	  Union	  Company	   WU-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Thermo	  Fisher	  Scientific	  Inc.	   TMO-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Thomas	  &	  Betts	  Corporation	   TNB-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Tiffany	  &	  Co.	   TIF-­‐US	   Retail	  
Time	  Warner	  Cable	  Inc.	   TWC-­‐US	   Communication	  
Time	  Warner	  Inc.	   TWX-­‐US	   Games	  
Timken	  Co	   TKR-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Titanium	  Metals	  Corp	   TIE-­‐US	   Steel	  
Total	  System	  Services,	  Inc.	   TSS-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Toys	  R	  US,	  Inc.	   TOY-­‐US	   Retail	  
Tractor	  Supply	  Company	   TSCO-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Trane	  Inc.	   TT-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Transocean	  LTD	   RIG-­‐US	   Oil	  
Tripadvisor	  Inc.	   TRIP-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  Inc.	   FOXA-­‐US	   Communication	  
Tyco	  International	  Ltd.	   TYC-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Tyson	  Foods,	  Inc.	   TSN-­‐US	   Food	  
Union	  Pacific	  Corporation	   UNP-­‐US	   Transportation	  
Unisys	  Corporation	   UIS-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
United	  Parcel	  Service,	  Inc.	   UPS-­‐US	   Transportation	  
United	  States	  Steel	  Corporation	   X-­‐US	   Steel	  
United	  Technologies	  Corporation	   UTX-­‐US	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	  
Univision	  Communications	  Inc.	   UVN-­‐US	   Communication	  
Unocal	  Corporation	   UCL-­‐US	   Oil	  
Urban	  Outfitters,	  Inc.	   URBN-­‐US	   Retail	  
US	  Airways	  Group	  Inc.	   LCC-­‐US	   Transportation	  
W.W.	  Grainger,	  Inc.	   GWW-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Valero	  Energy	  Corporation	   VLO-­‐US	   Oil	  
Walgreen	  Company	   WAG-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Wal-­‐Mart	  Stores,	  Inc.	   WMT-­‐US	   Wholesale	  
Varian	  Medical	  Systems,	  Inc.	   VAR-­‐US	   Health	  
Waste	  Management,	  Inc.	   WM-­‐US	   Other	  
Waters	  Corporation	   WAT-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Weatherford	  International	  Ltd	   WFT-­‐US	   Oil	  
Verisign,	  Inc.	   VRSN-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Verizon	  Communications	  Inc.	   VZ-­‐US	   Communication	  
Vertex	  Pharmaceuticals	  Incorporated	   VRTX-­‐US	   Health	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Western	  Digital	  Corp	   WDC-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Weyerhaeuser	  Company	   WY-­‐US	   Construction	  
VF	  Corp	   VFC-­‐US	   Apparel	  
Whirlpool	  Corporation	   WHR-­‐US	   Consumer	  goods	  
Whole	  Foods	  Market,	  Inc.	   WFM-­‐US	   Retail	  
Viacom,	  Inc.	   VIAB-­‐US	   Communication	  
Windstream	  Holdings	  Inc.	   WIN-­‐US	   Communication	  
Winn-­‐Dixie	  Stores,	  Inc.	   WINN-­‐US	   Retail	  
Visa	  Inc.	   V-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Vitesse	  Semiconductor	   VTSS-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Worthington	  Industries,	  Inc.	   WOR-­‐US	   Steel	  
WPX	  Energy	  Inc.	   WPX-­‐US	   Oil	  
Vulcan	  Materials	  Company	   VMC-­‐US	   Mines	  
Wyndham	  Worldwide	  Corporation	   WYN-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
Wynn	  Resorts,	  Limited	   WYNN-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
Xerox	  Corp	   XRX-­‐US	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	  
Xilinx,	  Inc.	   XLNX-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
XTO	  Energy	  Inc.	   XTO-­‐US	   Oil	  
Xylem	  Inc.	   XYL-­‐US	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	  
Yahoo!	  Inc.	   YHOO-­‐US	   Business	  equipment	  
Yum!	  Brands,	  Inc.	   YUM-­‐US	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	  
Zimmer	  Holdings,	  Inc.	   ZMH-­‐US	   Health	  
Zoetis	  Inc.	   ZTS-­‐US	   Health	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Appendix 2: Total public M&A sample 
Total	  sample	  of	  M&A	  deals	  in	  regression	  analysis	  (excl.	  financial	  and	  utility	  firms)	  
Acquirer	   French	  industry	   Year	   DV	  $mn	   Premium	  
Abbott	  Laboratories	   Health	   2003	   381	   18,08%	  
Applied	  Micro	  Circuits	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2003	   100	   7,69%	  
Archer	  Daniels	  Midland	  Company	   Food	   2003	   56	   25,71%	  
Automatic	  Data	  Processing	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2003	   550	   87,02%	  
Caremark	  Rx,	  Inc.	   Health	   2003	   6249	   45,12%	  
Cephalon,	  Inc.	   Health	   2003	   397	   19,76%	  
Cephalon,	  Inc.	   Health	   2003	   161	   -­‐46,95%	  
Chiron	  Corporation	   Health	   2003	   861	   17,65%	  
Cisco	  Systems,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2003	   57	   37,63%	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2003	   797	   19,01%	  
Devon	  Energy	  Corp	   Oil	   2003	   5300	   6,96%	  
Eli	  Lilly	  and	  Co	   Health	   2003	   340	   47,78%	  
EMC	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2003	   1688	   51,47%	  
EMC	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2003	   1251	   33,97%	  
Fisher	  Scientific	  International	  LLC	   Wholesale	   2003	   753	   37,46%	  
General	  Dynamics	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2003	   1500	   46,02%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2003	   9840	   48,94%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2003	   56	   7,52%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2003	   3352	   4,73%	  
Genzyme	  Corporation	   Health	   2003	   544	   59,01%	  
Honeywell	  International	  Inc.	   Auto	   2003	   56	   64,72%	  
International	  Game	  Technology	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2003	   106	   31,43%	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   Health	   2003	   2400	   25,38%	  
Leucadia	  National	  Corp.	   Food	   2003	   425	   14,22%	  
Motorola	  Solutions	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2003	   52	   45,68%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2003	   9833	   60,61%	  
Parker-­‐Hannifin	  Corporation	   Construction	   2003	   186	   6,67%	  
Pfizer	  Inc.	   Health	   2003	   1244	   60,77%	  
Philip	  Morris	  International	  Inc.	   Tobacco	   2003	   598	   0,78%	  
Precision	  Castparts	  Corp.	   Steel	   2003	   729	   46,13%	  
Symantec	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2003	   87	   57,48%	  
The	  Procter	  &	  Gamble	  Company	   Consumer	  goods	   2003	   7116	   59,44%	  
United	  Technologies	  Corporation	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	   2003	   1965	   9,09%	  
VF	  Corp	   Apparel	   2003	   502	   60,38%	  
Yahoo!	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2003	   1520	   52,46%	  
Zimmer	  Holdings,	  Inc.	   Health	   2003	   3431	   16,18%	  
Abbott	  Laboratories	   Health	   2004	   1200	   47,78%	  
Amgen,	  Inc.	   Health	   2004	   1146	   35,87%	  
Anheuser	  Busch	  Inbev	  SA	   Beer	   2004	   2009	   78,98%	  
Applied	  Materials,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   96	   87,11%	  
AT&T	  Inc.	   Communication	   2004	   47023	   50,15%	  
Biomet	  Inc.	   Health	   2004	   267	   20,73%	  
BMC	  Software,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2004	   186	   37,50%	  
BorgWarner	  Inc.	   Auto	   2004	   320	   16,70%	  
CA,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2004	   340	   70,64%	  
CareFusion	  Corporation	   Health	   2004	   2004	   20,75%	  
CBS	  Corporation	   Communication	   2004	   410	   12,44%	  
Circuit	  City	  Stores	  Inc.	   Retail	   2004	   257	   14,57%	  
Cisco	  Systems,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   89	   43,42%	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  Enterprises	  Inc.	   Food	   2004	   538	   12,32%	  
ConocoPhillips	   Oil	   2004	   1988	   4,41%	  
Constellation	  Brands,	  Inc.	   Beer	   2004	   1360	   39,54%	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   193	   35,54%	  
Ecolab	  Inc.	   Consumer	  goods	   2004	   54	   31,25%	  
Fisher	  Scientific	  International	  LLC	   Wholesale	   2004	   3599	   1,74%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2004	   1270	   60,58%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2004	   756	   31,30%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2004	   247	   19,65%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2004	   827	   2,75%	  
Genzyme	  Corporation	   Health	   2004	   832	   9,47%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   95	   54,82%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   277	   34,23%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   308	   22,35%	  
Honeywell	  International	  Inc.	   Auto	   2004	   2063	   18,97%	  
Juniper	  Networks,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   3765	   52,24%	  
National-­‐Oilwell	  Varco,	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2004	   2892	   10,16%	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Noble	  Energy,	  Inc.	   Oil	   2004	   3400	   31,02%	  
Perrigo	  Company	  PLC	   Health	   2004	   852	   35,34%	  
Philip	  Morris	  International	  Inc.	   Tobacco	   2004	   309	   49,24%	  
Pioneer	  Natural	  Resources	   Oil	   2004	   1934	   15,90%	  
Pitney	  Bowes	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   321	   58,08%	  
Reebok	  International	  Ltd.	   Apparel	   2004	   285	   52,87%	  
Sanmina	  Corp	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   77	   17,65%	  
St.	  Jude	  Medical,	  Inc.	   Health	   2004	   265	   51,81%	  
Symantec	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2004	   11354	   39,47%	  
Tektronix,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   325	   39,98%	  
Tellabs,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2004	   893	   1,82%	  
The	  J.M.	  Smucker	  Company	   Food	   2004	   840	   29,20%	  
United	  Technologies	  Corporation	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	   2004	   3140	   3,09%	  
VF	  Corp	   Apparel	   2004	   333	   38,76%	  
3M	  Co	   Health	   2005	   1306	   33,33%	  
Adobe	  Systems	  Incorporated	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2005	   2778	   19,29%	  
Allergan,	  Inc.	   Health	   2005	   3050	   0,83%	  
Amgen,	  Inc.	   Health	   2005	   2650	   65,81%	  
Barrick	  Gold	  Corporation	  (USA)	   Mines	   2005	   10033	   31,20%	  
CA,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2005	   283	   70,04%	  
CA,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2005	   357	   63,93%	  
Chevron	  Corporation	   Oil	   2005	   18569	   3,72%	  
Cisco	  Systems,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   5300	   25,40%	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  Enterprises	  Inc.	   Food	   2005	   305	   24,65%	  
ConocoPhillips	   Oil	   2005	   35600	   37,68%	  
eBay	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2005	   480	   59,70%	  
Electronic	  Arts	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2005	   683	   52,54%	  
EMC	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   275	   10,20%	  
Express	  Scripts	  Holding	  Co	   Retail	   2005	   1249	   12,27%	  
GameStop	  Corp.	   Retail	   2005	   1165	   33,26%	  
General	  Dynamics	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   2200	   23,61%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2005	   1326	   43,65%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2005	   4528	   7,40%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2005	   4836	   -­‐1,70%	  
Genzyme	  Corporation	   Health	   2005	   600	   26,49%	  
Harris	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   425	   39,25%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   383	   33,74%	  
Honeywell	  International	  Inc.	   Auto	   2005	   668	   73,03%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   174	   42,42%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   722	   33,69%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   934	   16,79%	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   Health	   2005	   370	   33,14%	  
Johnson	  Controls	  Inc.	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	   2005	   3200	   33,19%	  
L-­‐3	  Communications	  Holdings,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   2596	   24,66%	  
McKesson	  Corporation	   Wholesale	   2005	   469	   77,70%	  
McKesson	  Corporation	   Wholesale	   2005	   105	   41,94%	  
Medco	  Health	  Solutions	  Inc.	   Retail	   2005	   2432	   46,78%	  
Nortel	  Networks	  Corporation	  (USA)	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   448	   27,89%	  
NVIDIA	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   52	   -­‐11,28%	  
Occidental	  Petroleum	  Corporation	   Oil	   2005	   3898	   26,01%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2005	   568	   42,63%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2005	   3610	   27,97%	  
Parker-­‐Hannifin	  Corporation	   Construction	   2005	   487	   87,92%	  
Pfizer	  Inc.	   Health	   2005	   1775	   67,24%	  
Philip	  Morris	  International	  Inc.	   Tobacco	   2005	   5122	   43,09%	  
Quest	  Diagnostics	  Inc.	   Health	   2005	   934	   10,47%	  
Seagate	  Technology	  PLC	   Business	  equipment	   2005	   1862	   95,95%	  
Sprint	  Corp	   Communication	   2005	   10459	   22,31%	  
Sprint	  Corp	   Communication	   2005	   4300	   12,52%	  
St.	  Jude	  Medical,	  Inc.	   Health	   2005	   1294	   21,77%	  
SUPERVALU	  INC.	   Retail	   2005	   231	   3,64%	  
Symantec	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2005	   178	   15,61%	  
The	  Procter	  &	  Gamble	  Company	   Consumer	  goods	   2005	   55692	   19,87%	  
Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  Inc.	   Communication	   2005	   571	   54,84%	  
Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  Inc.	   Communication	   2005	   6293	   16,54%	  
Tyco	  International	  Ltd.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2005	   147	   25,52%	  
United	  Parcel	  Service,	  Inc.	   Transportation	   2005	   1296	   44,22%	  
Valero	  Energy	  Corporation	   Oil	   2005	   7900	   22,12%	  
Verizon	  Communications	  Inc.	   Communication	   2005	   10632	   38,22%	  
Whirlpool	  Corporation	   Consumer	  goods	   2005	   2585	   33,16%	  
3M	  Co	   Health	   2006	   106	   36,84%	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Abbott	  Laboratories	   Health	   2006	   3248	   60,16%	  
Advanced	  Micro	  Devices,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   5107	   35,20%	  
Anadarko	  Petroleum	  Corporation	   Oil	   2006	   18000	   34,93%	  
Anadarko	  Petroleum	  Corporation	   Oil	   2006	   5112	   27,86%	  
Applied	  Materials,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   286	   47,67%	  
AT&T	  Inc.	   Communication	   2006	   89437	   25,77%	  
Barr	  Pharmaceuticals	  Inc.	   Health	   2006	   2678	   16,75%	  
Barrick	  Gold	  Corporation	  (USA)	   Mines	   2006	   51	   35,81%	  
Becton,	  Dickinson	  and	  Co.	   Health	   2006	   332	   63,72%	  
Boston	  Scientific	  Corporation	   Health	   2006	   24975	   20,25%	  
Constellation	  Brands,	  Inc.	   Beer	   2006	   1294	   59,79%	  
Crown	  Castle	  International	  Corp.	   Communication	   2006	   5631	   12,99%	  
CVS	  Caremark	  Corporation	   Retail	   2006	   19840	   -­‐11,81%	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   369	   69,68%	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   2103	   25,64%	  
Eaton	  Corporation	  PLC	   Electrical	  equipment	   2006	   58	   15,50%	  
Eli	  Lilly	  and	  Co	   Health	   2006	   2392	   40,55%	  
EMC	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   1905	   88,17%	  
Emerson	  Electric	  Co.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   474	   6,80%	  
Freeport-­‐McMoRan	  Copper	  &	  Gold	  Inc.	   Mines	   2006	   22635	   29,07%	  
Frontier	  Communications	  Corp	   Communication	   2006	   1105	   22,02%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2006	   625	   48,39%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2006	   215	   47,06%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2006	   442	   46,54%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2006	   3000	   36,29%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2006	   588	   -­‐6,57%	  
Genzyme	  Corporation	   Health	   2006	   529	   110,61%	  
Gilead	  Sciences,	  Inc.	   Health	   2006	   2054	   50,00%	  
Global	  Crossing	  Ltd	   Communication	   2006	   123	   74,51%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   4500	   46,69%	  
Hospira,	  Inc.	   Health	   2006	   1913	   36,67%	  
Illinois	  Tool	  Works	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2006	   271	   60,78%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   1050	   28,15%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   1183	   28,06%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   550	   24,64%	  
Intuit	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2006	   1176	   26,38%	  
Jabil	  Circuit,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   901	   22,06%	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   Health	   2006	   1298	   35,68%	  
KLA-­‐Tencor	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   392	   6,77%	  
L-­‐3	  Communications	  Holdings,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   151	   3,00%	  
LSI	  Corp	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   3539	   31,49%	  
Mattel,	  Inc.	   Games	   2006	   186	   8,96%	  
McKesson	  Corporation	   Wholesale	   2006	   1640	   19,81%	  
Merck	  &	  Co.,	  Inc.	   Health	   2006	   855	   135,51%	  
Micron	  Technology,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   763	   48,22%	  
Molex	  Incorporated	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   248	   10,06%	  
Monsanto	  Company	   Chemicals	   2006	   1632	   33,04%	  
Motorola	  Solutions	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   3622	   34,89%	  
Motorola	  Solutions	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   180	   13,45%	  
Mylan	  Inc.	   Health	   2006	   723	   18,97%	  
National-­‐Oilwell	  Varco,	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2006	   307	   11,90%	  
Northrop	  Grumman	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   580	   35,21%	  
NVIDIA	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   162	   22,06%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2006	   867	   50,96%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2006	   210	   39,60%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2006	   149	   36,67%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2006	   378	   27,00%	  
Peabody	  Energy	  Corporation	   Coal	   2006	   1710	   8,57%	  
SanDisk	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   1371	   21,50%	  
Service	  Corporation	  International	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2006	   1175	   18,41%	  
Sprint	  Corp	   Communication	   2006	   1278	   3,40%	  
The	  Boeing	  Company	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	   2006	   1992	   26,05%	  
The	  Home	  Depot,	  Inc.	   Retail	   2006	   3470	   13,36%	  
The	  Walt	  Disney	  Company	   Communication	   2006	   6400	   11,32%	  
Thermo	  Fisher	  Scientific	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2006	   11880	   18,66%	  
Zoetis	  Inc.	   Health	   2006	   162	   42,86%	  
3M	  Co	   Health	   2007	   76	   34,58%	  
Agilent	  Technologies	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   207	   28,71%	  
AT&T	  Inc.	   Communication	   2007	   5306	   25,85%	  
Avery	  Dennison	  Corp	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	   2007	   1271	   34,36%	  
Barrick	  Gold	  Corporation	  (USA)	   Mines	   2007	   791	   36,95%	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CareFusion	  Corporation	   Health	   2007	   1447	   27,42%	  
Celgene	  Corporation	   Health	   2007	   2547	   48,70%	  
Cisco	  Systems,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   2506	   21,80%	  
Computer	  Sciences	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   115	   41,11%	  
Computer	  Sciences	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   290	   26,21%	  
Computer	  Sciences	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   1114	   25,51%	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   2717	   19,31%	  
Darden	  Restaurants,	  Inc.	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	   2007	   1262	   37,03%	  
Deere	  &	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2007	   159	   39,56%	  
Eaton	  Corporation	  PLC	   Electrical	  equipment	   2007	   642	   65,98%	  
Ecolab	  Inc.	   Consumer	  goods	   2007	   261	   39,38%	  
EMC	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   57	   73,12%	  
Emerson	  Electric	  Co.	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   85	   6,67%	  
Equifax	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2007	   1223	   27,33%	  
Fidelity	  National	  Information	  Services	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2007	   1694	   9,68%	  
Fiserv	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2007	   4439	   17,33%	  
FLIR	  Systems,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   84	   33,71%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2007	   299	   -­‐83,90%	  
Genzyme	  Corporation	   Health	   2007	   335	   51,35%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   1430	   47,67%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   249	   24,43%	  
Ingersoll-­‐Rand	  PLC	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   11155	   33,66%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   726	   24,90%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   143	   18,00%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   4393	   11,75%	  
Intuit	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2007	   109	   32,40%	  
KLA-­‐Tencor	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   62	   34,15%	  
Lam	  Research	  Corporation	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2007	   470	   59,12%	  
LyondellBasell	  Industries	  NV	   Chemicals	   2007	   18569	   22,61%	  
Marathon	  Oil	  Corporation	   Oil	   2007	   6175	   0,42%	  
Medco	  Health	  Solutions	  Inc.	   Retail	   2007	   1257	   30,99%	  
Medtronic,	  Inc.	   Health	   2007	   3615	   45,40%	  
Medtronic,	  Inc.	   Health	   2007	   221	   -­‐35,23%	  
Microsoft	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2007	   5032	   111,78%	  
National-­‐Oilwell	  Varco,	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2007	   7333	   22,99%	  
Newmont	  Mining	  Corp	   Mines	   2007	   1294	   31,35%	  
Nike	  Inc.	   Apparel	   2007	   641	   76,07%	  
Nucor	  Corporation	   Steel	   2007	   1182	   29,31%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2007	   2867	   21,81%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2007	   495	   17,73%	  
Parker-­‐Hannifin	  Corporation	   Construction	   2007	   270	   41,23%	  
PerkinElmer,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   260	   68,61%	  
Pfizer	  Inc.	   Health	   2007	   156	   151,57%	  
Philip	  Morris	  International	  Inc.	   Tobacco	   2007	   404	   87,40%	  
Pitney	  Bowes	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   396	   44,64%	  
Quanta	  Services	  Inc.	   Construction	   2007	   1236	   38,47%	  
Schlumberger	  Limited.	   Oil	   2007	   748	   93,04%	  
Symantec	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2007	   794	   30,02%	  
Teradyne,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   300	   42,05%	  
Textron	  Inc.	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	   2007	   950	   18,32%	  
Thomas	  &	  Betts	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   452	   -­‐1,82%	  
Transocean	  LTD	   Oil	   2007	   17102	   1,45%	  
Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  Inc.	   Communication	   2007	   5516	   4,44%	  
Walgreen	  Company	   Wholesale	   2007	   742	   28,97%	  
Wal-­‐Mart	  Stores,	  Inc.	   Wholesale	   2007	   557	   72,84%	  
Verizon	  Communications	  Inc.	   Communication	   2007	   2613	   2,72%	  
Western	  Digital	  Corp	   Business	  equipment	   2007	   972	   35,56%	  
Whole	  Foods	  Market,	  Inc.	   Retail	   2007	   660	   26,28%	  
Windstream	  Holdings	  Inc.	   Communication	   2007	   577	   24,85%	  
Vulcan	  Materials	  Company	   Mines	   2007	   4428	   45,43%	  
Xerox	  Corp	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2007	   1655	   45,00%	  
Amazon.com,	  Inc.	   Retail	   2008	   300	   28,92%	  
Anheuser	  Busch	  Inbev	  SA	   Beer	   2008	   58563	   14,53%	  
Ashland	  Inc.	   Chemicals	   2008	   3313	   27,27%	  
AT&T	  Inc.	   Communication	   2008	   2795	   84,38%	  
Autodesk,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2008	   195	   24,29%	  
Barrick	  Gold	  Corporation	   Mines	   2008	   322	   28,38%	  
Best	  Buy	  Co	  Inc.	   Retail	   2008	   92	   68,79%	  
BMC	  Software,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2008	   695	   60,92%	  
CBS	  Corporation	   Communication	   2008	   1706	   47,63%	  
CenturyLink,	  Inc.	   Communication	   2008	   11501	   -­‐5,99%	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Cliffs	  Natural	  Resources	  Inc.	   Steel	   2008	   452	   18,46%	  
Covidien	  plc.	   Health	   2008	   70	   88,18%	  
CVS	  Caremark	  Corporation	   Retail	   2008	   2774	   73,76%	  
Delta	  Air	  Lines,	  Inc.	   Transportation	   2008	   6509	   37,75%	  
DIRECTV	   Communication	   2008	   105	   56,52%	  
Eli	  Lilly	  and	  Co	   Health	   2008	   5781	   9,67%	  
Eli	  Lilly	  and	  Co	   Health	   2008	   150	   -­‐50,48%	  
EMC	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2008	   159	   44,74%	  
EMC	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2008	   73	   24,87%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2008	   732	   37,93%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2008	   877	   31,56%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2008	   13044	   47,15%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2008	   266	   53,57%	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   Health	   2008	   1101	   83,43%	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   Health	   2008	   348	   69,49%	  
KLA-­‐Tencor	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2008	   477	   46,41%	  
Manitowoc	  Company,	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2008	   2632	   115,79%	  
McAfee,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2008	   412	   31,88%	  
Medtronic,	  Inc.	   Health	   2008	   381	   96,63%	  
Microsoft	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2008	   1069	   81,98%	  
Microsoft	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2008	   396	   21,02%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2008	   6630	   24,36%	  
O'Reilly	  Automotive	  Inc.	   Retail	   2008	   985	   32,30%	  
Pfizer	  Inc.	   Health	   2008	   347	   245,59%	  
Philip	  Morris	  International	  Inc.	   Tobacco	   2008	   1953	   10,37%	  
Republic	  Services,	  Inc.	   Transportation	   2008	   12319	   12,20%	  
Smith	  International,	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2008	   3074	   24,48%	  
St.	  Jude	  Medical,	  Inc.	   Health	   2008	   89	   93,55%	  
Staples,	  Inc.	   Retail	   2008	   4288	   30,28%	  
Teradyne,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2008	   275	   26,82%	  
Terex	  Corporation	   Auto	   2008	   439	   51,13%	  
The	  Dow	  Chemical	  Company	   Chemicals	   2008	   18166	   51,13%	  
Toys	  R	  US,	  Inc.	   Retail	   2008	   519	   2,68%	  
Walgreen	  Company	   Wholesale	   2008	   241	   38,82%	  
Wal-­‐Mart	  Stores,	  Inc.	   Wholesale	   2008	   3667	   33,99%	  
Abbott	  Laboratories	   Health	   2009	   2711	   274,15%	  
Adobe	  Systems	  Incorporated	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2009	   1554	   47,46%	  
Agilent	  Technologies	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   1351	   29,87%	  
Alpha	  Natural	  Resources,	  Inc.	   Coal	   2009	   1928	   90,06%	  
Altria	  Group	  Inc.	   Tobacco	   2009	   11487	   12,44%	  
Applied	  Materials,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   327	   32,69%	  
Baker	  Hughes	  Incorporated	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2009	   5530	   26,52%	  
Bristol-­‐Myers	  Squibb	  Co	   Health	   2009	   2100	   93,24%	  
Cameron	  International	  Corporation	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2009	   728	   45,73%	  
Cephalon,	  Inc.	   Health	   2009	   102	   66,67%	  
Cisco	  Systems,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   2097	   43,15%	  
Cisco	  Systems,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   3068	   41,42%	  
Cliffs	  Natural	  Resources	  Inc.	   Steel	   2009	   184	   104,96%	  
Covidien	  plc.	   Health	   2009	   64	   246,67%	  
Covidien	  plc.	   Health	   2009	   190	   84,62%	  
Covidien	  plc.	   Health	   2009	   396	   40,64%	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   78	   37,10%	  
Dell	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   3807	   76,47%	  
Denbury	  Resources	  Inc.	   Oil	   2009	   4014	   36,31%	  
EMC	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   1806	   2,79%	  
Emerson	  Electric	  Co.	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   1124	   40,06%	  
Emerson	  Electric	  Co.	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   242	   39,47%	  
Exxon	  Mobil	  Corporation	   Oil	   2009	   40634	   20,08%	  
Fidelity	  National	  Information	  Services	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2009	   4175	   46,16%	  
General	  Dynamics	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   613	   18,63%	  
Gilead	  Sciences,	  Inc.	   Health	   2009	   1314	   27,15%	  
Google	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2009	   132	   53,81%	  
Hess	  Corp.	   Oil	   2009	   395	   6,83%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   2632	   39,82%	  
Intel	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   793	   52,12%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2009	   744	   51,79%	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   Health	   2009	   818	   23,35%	  
Merck	  &	  Co.,	  Inc.	   Health	   2009	   43198	   17,52%	  
Mondelez	  International	  Inc.	   Food	   2009	   23011	   7,02%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2009	   5629	   17,28%	  
PepsiCo,	  Inc.	   Food	   2009	   10640	   7,99%	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PepsiCo,	  Inc.	   Food	   2009	   4193	   5,83%	  
Pfizer	  Inc.	   Health	   2009	   59	   63,74%	  
Pfizer	  Inc.	   Health	   2009	   65016	   38,88%	  
Sprint	  Corp	   Communication	   2009	   802	   32,16%	  
Sprint	  Corp	   Communication	   2009	   731	   25,57%	  
Stanley	  Black	  &	  Decker,	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2009	   4364	   40,52%	  
The	  Walt	  Disney	  Company	   Communication	   2009	   3843	   26,39%	  
Time	  Warner	  Cable	  Inc.	   Communication	   2009	   242	   95,76%	  
Time	  Warner	  Inc.	   Games	   2009	   1782	   95,76%	  
Toys	  R	  US,	  Inc.	   Retail	   2009	   627	   40,43%	  
Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  Inc.	   Communication	   2009	   157	   -­‐14,45%	  
United	  Technologies	  Corporation	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	   2009	   185	   30,00%	  
United	  Technologies	  Corporation	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	   2009	   206	   -­‐9,91%	  
Windstream	  Holdings	  Inc.	   Communication	   2009	   330	   97,82%	  
Windstream	  Holdings	  Inc.	   Communication	   2009	   1124	   32,54%	  
Xerox	  Corp	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2009	   7352	   38,73%	  
3M	  Co	   Health	   2010	   625	   16,80%	  
Abbott	  Laboratories	   Health	   2010	   402	   71,21%	  
Adobe	  Systems	  Incorporated	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2010	   181	   56,95%	  
Allegheny	  Technologies	  Incorporated	   Steel	   2010	   792	   51,70%	  
Apache	  Corporation	   Oil	   2010	   3917	   69,25%	  
Barrick	  Gold	  Corporation	  (USA)	   Mines	   2010	   69	   110,53%	  
Bristol-­‐Myers	  Squibb	  Co	   Health	   2010	   732	   138,97%	  
C.R.	  Bard,	  Inc.	   Health	   2010	   176	   42,30%	  
Caterpillar	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2010	   8609	   23,84%	  
Celgene	  Corporation	   Health	   2010	   2733	   61,85%	  
CenturyLink,	  Inc.	   Communication	   2010	   22153	   19,99%	  
Cephalon,	  Inc.	   Health	   2010	   1069	   61,11%	  
Chevron	  Corporation	   Oil	   2010	   4513	   42,80%	  
CONSOL	  Energy	  Inc.	   Coal	   2010	   965	   0,66%	  
Covidien	  plc.	   Health	   2010	   264	   30,41%	  
Covidien	  plc.	   Health	   2010	   2453	   17,62%	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   299	   124,77%	  
Dell	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   824	   12,90%	  
EMC	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   2134	   22,11%	  
Emerson	  Electric	  Co.	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   1548	   34,65%	  
FLIR	  Systems,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   226	   3,99%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2010	   541	   45,77%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2010	   1377	   4,11%	  
General	  Motors	  Company	   Auto	   2010	   3306	   23,80%	  
Google	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2010	   69	   13,02%	  
Halliburton	  Company	   Oil	   2010	   275	   45,63%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   1969	   239,51%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   1375	   70,39%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   1141	   46,53%	  
Honeywell	  International	  Inc.	   Auto	   2010	   1380	   67,26%	  
Honeywell	  International	  Inc.	   Auto	   2010	   129	   22,53%	  
Hospira,	  Inc.	   Health	   2010	   112	   54,93%	  
Intel	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   6511	   57,95%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   409	   113,20%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   1572	   75,44%	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   Health	   2010	   1994	   60,25%	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   Health	   2010	   358	   23,03%	  
Medtronic,	  Inc.	   Health	   2010	   120	   117,39%	  
Microchip	  Technology	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   241	   19,14%	  
Nabors	  Industries	  Ltd.	   Oil	   2010	   821	   26,33%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2010	   797	   45,99%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2010	   614	   35,57%	  
PepsiCo,	  Inc.	   Food	   2010	   6127	   112,55%	  
Pfizer	  Inc.	   Health	   2010	   3214	   52,08%	  
Pitney	  Bowes	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   55	   27,84%	  
Raytheon	  Company	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	   2010	   480	   14,84%	  
Schlumberger	  Limited.	   Oil	   2010	   12198	   47,88%	  
Southwest	  Airlines	  Co	   Transportation	   2010	   1560	   69,06%	  
St.	  Jude	  Medical,	  Inc.	   Health	   2010	   1241	   41,50%	  
Staples,	  Inc.	   Retail	   2010	   494	   30,54%	  
Stryker	  Corporation	   Health	   2010	   316	   80,75%	  
TE	  Connectivity	  Ltd	   Wholesale	   2010	   1258	   64,94%	  
The	  Boeing	  Company	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	   2010	   734	   43,45%	  
Thermo	  Fisher	  Scientific	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2010	   2091	   30,55%	  
Time	  Warner	  Cable	  Inc.	   Communication	   2010	   172	   36,91%	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Time	  Warner	  Inc.	   Games	   2010	   172	   36,91%	  
Tyco	  International	  Ltd.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2010	   1836	   33,44%	  
Wal-­‐Mart	  Stores,	  Inc.	   Wholesale	   2010	   2083	   2,72%	  
Viacom,	  Inc.	   Communication	   2010	   96	   192,56%	  
3M	  Co	   Health	   2011	   670	   47,37%	  
3M	  Co	   Health	   2011	   428	   12,55%	  
Alpha	  Natural	  Resources,	  Inc.	   Coal	   2011	   8156	   31,36%	  
Applied	  Materials,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   4331	   33,19%	  
Archer	  Daniels	  Midland	  Company	   Food	   2011	   161	   25,82%	  
Barrick	  Gold	  Corporation	  (USA)	   Mines	   2011	   7535	   53,74%	  
Baxter	  International	  Inc.	   Health	   2011	   258	   53,09%	  
Broadcom	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   3449	   58,38%	  
C.R.	  Bard,	  Inc.	   Health	   2011	   67	   108,59%	  
Caterpillar	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2011	   684	   76,00%	  
CenturyLink,	  Inc.	   Communication	   2011	   2706	   11,61%	  
Cephalon,	  Inc.	   Health	   2011	   207	   64,71%	  
Chesapeake	  Energy	  Corporation	   Oil	   2011	   278	   14,23%	  
Cliffs	  Natural	  Resources	  Inc.	   Steel	   2011	   4330	   43,84%	  
Computer	  Sciences	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   404	   203,57%	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   6724	   12,22%	  
Delta	  Air	  Lines,	  Inc.	   Transportation	   2011	   100	   46,55%	  
E	  I	  Du	  Pont	  De	  Nemours	  And	  Co	   Chemicals	   2011	   6312	   5,39%	  
eBay	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2011	   1941	   40,69%	  
Ecolab	  Inc.	   Consumer	  goods	   2011	   8138	   44,67%	  
ENSCO	  PLC	   Oil	   2011	   8735	   29,51%	  
Express	  Scripts	  Holding	  Co	   Retail	   2011	   33430	   26,84%	  
General	  Dynamics	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   237	   44,13%	  
Gilead	  Sciences,	  Inc.	   Health	   2011	   10367	   88,86%	  
Google	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2011	   8950	   89,39%	  
Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Company	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   10255	   47,40%	  
Honeywell	  International	  Inc.	   Auto	   2011	   478	   35,97%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   375	   57,90%	  
International	  Game	  Technology	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2011	   89	   57,71%	  
International	  Paper	  Company	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	   2011	   4167	   32,40%	  
International	  Paper	  Company	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	   2011	   327	   31,55%	  
Johnson	  &	  Johnson	   Health	   2011	   21191	   31,07%	  
Joy	  Global	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2011	   1397	   20,57%	  
Laboratory	  Corp.	  of	  America	  Holdings	   Health	   2011	   76	   40,00%	  
Lam	  Research	  Corporation	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2011	   3298	   25,69%	  
McKesson	  Corporation	   Wholesale	   2011	   114	   37,93%	  
Merck	  &	  Co.,	  Inc.	   Health	   2011	   374	   25,00%	  
National-­‐Oilwell	  Varco,	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2011	   634	   38,21%	  
NCR	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   1050	   47,21%	  
Newmont	  Mining	  Corp	   Mines	   2011	   2088	   23,46%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2011	   1496	   38,04%	  
PerkinElmer,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   547	   45,83%	  
QUALCOMM,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   2741	   33,10%	  
Quest	  Diagnostics	  Inc.	   Health	   2011	   602	   23,27%	  
Stanley	  Black	  &	  Decker,	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2011	   1131	   3,63%	  
Terex	  Corporation	   Auto	   2011	   1466	   -­‐4,21%	  
Texas	  Instruments	  Incorporated	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   6281	   61,19%	  
The	  Coca-­‐Cola	  Company	   Food	   2011	   268	   64,25%	  
The	  Walt	  Disney	  Company	   Communication	   2011	   501	   51,33%	  
Time	  Warner	  Cable	  Inc.	   Communication	   2011	   263	   48,25%	  
Transocean	  LTD	   Oil	   2011	   2262	   55,45%	  
Tyco	  International	  Ltd.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2011	   85	   47,64%	  
United	  Technologies	  Corporation	   Aircraft,	  ships	  and	  railroad	  equipment	   2011	   17861	   56,44%	  
Walgreen	  Company	   Wholesale	   2011	   397	   -­‐65,39%	  
Verizon	  Communications	  Inc.	   Communication	   2011	   1742	   45,71%	  
VF	  Corp	   Apparel	   2011	   1961	   26,81%	  
Windstream	  Holdings	  Inc.	   Communication	   2011	   2158	   18,49%	  
Yahoo!	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2011	   211	   62,16%	  
Yum!	  Brands,	  Inc.	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	   2011	   552	   26,21%	  
Amgen,	  Inc.	   Health	   2012	   885	   52,14%	  
Anheuser	  Busch	  Inbev	  SA	   Beer	   2012	   27856	   29,06%	  
Apple	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   339	   86,05%	  
Bausch	  &	  Lomb	  Inc.	   Health	   2012	   376	   9,64%	  
Bed	  Bath	  &	  Beyond	  Inc.	   Retail	   2012	   600	   23,87%	  
Bristol-­‐Myers	  Squibb	  Co	   Health	   2012	   2020	   81,82%	  
Bristol-­‐Myers	  Squibb	  Co	   Health	   2012	   6349	   9,89%	  
ConAgra	  Foods	  Inc.	   Food	   2012	   6740	   24,17%	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Covidien	  plc.	   Health	   2012	   295	   72,16%	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   338	   58,15%	  
Danaher	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   621	   22,25%	  
Dell	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   2231	   17,94%	  
Eastman	  Chemical	  Company	   Chemicals	   2012	   4600	   58,54%	  
Eaton	  Corporation	  PLC	   Electrical	  equipment	   2012	   11940	   15,92%	  
Exxon	  Mobil	  Corporation	   Oil	   2012	   2983	   27,42%	  
FLIR	  Systems,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   55	   31,71%	  
FMC	  Corp	   Chemicals	   2012	   298	   60,79%	  
Forest	  Laboratories,	  Inc.	   Health	   2012	   900	   85,64%	  
Freeport-­‐McMoRan	  Copper	  &	  Gold	  Inc.	   Mines	   2012	   10750	   37,86%	  
Freeport-­‐McMoRan	  Copper	  &	  Gold	  Inc.	   Mines	   2012	   3400	   18,00%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2012	   679	   27,00%	  
General	  Motors	  Company	   Auto	   2012	   405	   50,83%	  
General	  Motors	  Company	   Auto	   2012	   5500	   10,31%	  
Gilead	  Sciences,	  Inc.	   Health	   2012	   339	   73,53%	  
Honeywell	  International	  Inc.	   Auto	   2012	   598	   36,61%	  
Intel	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   3094	   4,10%	  
International	  Business	  Machines	  Corp.	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   1206	   86,69%	  
Laboratory	  Corp.	  of	  America	  Holdings	   Health	   2012	   241	   36,02%	  
Leucadia	  National	  Corp.	   Food	   2012	   3587	   19,89%	  
McKesson	  Corporation	   Wholesale	   2012	   1808	   25,76%	  
Medtronic,	  Inc.	   Health	   2012	   656	   33,81%	  
Microchip	  Technology	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   682	   42,14%	  
Motorola	  Solutions	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   158	   60,00%	  
National-­‐Oilwell	  Varco,	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2012	   221	   34,27%	  
National-­‐Oilwell	  Varco,	  Inc.	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2012	   2609	   28,81%	  
NCR	  Corporation	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   606	   50,15%	  
Nielsen	  Hldg	  NV	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2012	   1219	   32,52%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2012	   724	   34,13%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2012	   1810	   24,73%	  
Parker-­‐Hannifin	  Corporation	   Construction	   2012	   75	   104,92%	  
Precision	  Castparts	  Corp.	   Steel	   2012	   2969	   32,74%	  
Priceline	  Group	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2012	   1475	   19,65%	  
PVH	  Corp	   Apparel	   2012	   2787	   33,39%	  
Seagate	  Technology	  PLC	   Business	  equipment	   2012	   58	   28,17%	  
Sprint	  Corp	   Communication	   2012	   11480	   126,24%	  
Starbucks	  Corporation	   Restaurants,	  hotels,	  motels	   2012	   607	   23,11%	  
Stryker	  Corporation	   Health	   2012	   1471	   104,50%	  
The	  Home	  Depot,	  Inc.	   Retail	   2012	   93	   22,67%	  
Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  Fox	  Inc.	   Communication	   2012	   2154	   0,58%	  
Verizon	  Communications	  Inc.	   Communication	   2012	   671	   200,00%	  
Accenture	  Plc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2013	   280	   -­‐7,14%	  
Actavis	  PLC	   Health	   2013	   8428	   44,67%	  
Allergan,	  Inc.	   Health	   2013	   768	   62,02%	  
Amgen,	  Inc.	   Health	   2013	   9036	   -­‐4,39%	  
AT&T	  Inc.	   Communication	   2013	   3911	   158,18%	  
Autodesk,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2013	   253	   33,01%	  
C.R.	  Bard,	  Inc.	   Health	   2013	   228	   33,07%	  
Cisco	  Systems,	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2013	   2266	   43,67%	  
Covidien	  plc.	   Health	   2013	   934	   37,74%	  
Gannett	  Co.,	  Inc.	   Printing	  and	  publishing	   2013	   2142	   21,90%	  
General	  Electric	  Company	   Fabricated	  products	  and	  machinery	   2013	   3240	   37,66%	  
Georgia-­‐Pacific	  Corporation	   Business	  supplies	  and	  shipping	  containers	   2013	   1465	   27,59%	  
Maxim	  Integrated	  Products	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2013	   423	   44,29%	  
McAfee,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2013	   367	   110,28%	  
McGraw	  Hill	  Financial	  Inc.	   Printing	  and	  publishing	   2013	   224	   34,32%	  
Nielsen	  Hldg	  NV	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2013	   100	   6,25%	  
Office	  Depot	  Inc.	   Wholesale	   2013	   1423	   21,95%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2013	   1280	   66,26%	  
Oracle	  Corporation	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2013	   1962	   22,18%	  
Perrigo	  Company	  PLC	   Health	   2013	   6526	   16,69%	  
Perrigo	  Company	  PLC	   Health	   2013	   160	   -­‐50,00%	  
Pioneer	  Natural	  Resources	   Oil	   2013	   868	   13,42%	  
Salesforce.com,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2013	   2296	   58,15%	  
Seagate	  Technology	  PLC	   Business	  equipment	   2013	   279	   30,54%	  
Service	  Corporation	  International	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2013	   1393	   49,72%	  
Stryker	  Corporation	   Health	   2013	   691	   85,64%	  
Tenet	  Healthcare	  Corp	   Health	   2013	   4101	   71,57%	  
The	  Kroger	  Co.	   Retail	   2013	   2543	   5,20%	  
Thermo	  Fisher	  Scientific	  Inc.	   Business	  equipment	   2013	   15008	   20,25%	  
Do firms with excess cash pay higher premia?  
 81 
Total	  System	  Services,	  Inc.	   Personal	  and	  business	  services	   2013	   1160	   34,57%	  
Western	  Digital	  Corp	   Business	  equipment	   2013	   188	   92,96%	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Appendix 3: Current sample excess cash regression 
Current	  sample	  excess	  cash	  regression	  
Variable	   	  	   Coefficients	   P-­‐value	  
C	   	  	   -­‐4,8952	   0,0000	  
MB	   	  	   0,1431	   0,0000	  
Size	   	  	   -­‐0,0884	   0,0142	  
Cash	  flow	   	  	   1,5171	   0,0000	  
WC	   	  	   0,0017	   0,0509	  
RD	   	  	   0,0571	   0,0000	  
Indsigma	   	  	   4,7798	   0,0000	  
Leverage	   	  	   0,2656	   0,0000	  
Capex	   	  	   0,7103	   0,0000	  
Dividends	   	  	   -­‐0,0826	   0,0377	  
Autos	   	  	   1,2562	   0,0017	  
Beer	   	  	   -­‐0,1997	   0,6237	  
Books	   	  	   0,3356	   0,4442	  
Buseq	   	  	   1,3412	   0,0004	  
Varry	   	  	   1,1371	   0,0042	  
Chems	   	  	   0,9601	   0,0144	  
Clths	   	  	   1,3283	   0,0013	  
Cnstr	   	  	   1,3613	   0,0006	  
Coal	   	  	   -­‐1,2325	   0,0064	  
Elceq	   	  	   0,4931	   0,2659	  
Fabpr	   	  	   1,2610	   0,0011	  
Food	   	  	   0,6584	   0,0873	  
Games	   	  	   1,7302	   0,0000	  
Hlth	   	  	   1,4518	   0,0001	  
Hshld	   	  	   1,3966	   0,0005	  
Meals	   	  	   0,9229	   0,0189	  
Mines	   	  	   0,7000	   0,0919	  
Oil	   	  	   0,5799	   0,1368	  
Other	   	  	   -­‐0,5877	   0,1916	  
Paper	   	  	   0,7581	   0,0590	  
Rtail	   	  	   0,8792	   0,0197	  
Servs	   	  	   1,1690	   0,0018	  
Smoke	   	  	   1,0489	   0,0115	  
Steel	   	  	   0,8696	   0,0262	  
Telcm	   	  	   0,2951	   0,4371	  
Trans	   	  	   0,9576	   0,0139	  
Whlsl	   	  	   1,0749	   0,0056	  
N	   	  	   3652	   	  	  
R2	  adj	   	  	   0,4824	   	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
Do firms with excess cash pay higher premia?  
 83 
Appendix 4: Dropped sample excess cash regression 
Dropped	  sample	  excess	  cash	  regression	  
Variable	   	  	   Coefficients	   P-­‐value	  
C	   	  	   -­‐4,0509	   0,0000	  
MB	   	  	   0,1013	   0,0000	  
Size	   	  	   -­‐0,2895	   0,0000	  
Cash	  flow	   	  	   1,4207	   0,0000	  
WC	   	  	   0,0012	   0,1959	  
RD	   	  	   0,0560	   0,0000	  
Indsigma	   	  	   5,1696	   0,0000	  
Leverage	   	  	   0,4295	   0,0000	  
Capex	   	  	   0,6598	   0,0000	  
Dividends	   	  	   -­‐0,2086	   0,0000	  
Autos	   	  	   1,1574	   0,0000	  
Beer	   	  	   -­‐0,1020	   0,7510	  
Books	   	  	   0,3431	   0,2861	  
Buseq	   	  	   1,5083	   0,0000	  
Varry	   	  	   1,1562	   0,0002	  
Chems	   	  	   0,9841	   0,0011	  
Clths	   	  	   0,9393	   0,0005	  
Cnstr	   	  	   1,4701	   0,0000	  
Coal	   	  	   -­‐1,1897	   0,0009	  
Elceq	   	  	   0,6745	   0,0495	  
Fabpr	   	  	   1,1751	   0,0001	  
Food	   	  	   0,5954	   0,0429	  
Games	   	  	   1,6717	   0,0000	  
Hlth	   	  	   1,4201	   0,0000	  
Hshld	   	  	   1,4463	   0,0000	  
Meals	   	  	   0,8842	   0,0039	  
Mines	   	  	   1,0445	   0,0011	  
Oil	   	  	   0,4691	   0,1165	  
Other	   	  	   -­‐0,6720	   0,0624	  
Paper	   	  	   0,5807	   0,0636	  
Rtail	   	  	   0,8401	   0,0030	  
Servs	   	  	   1,2640	   0,0000	  
Smoke	   	  	   1,0601	   0,0016	  
Steel	   	  	   0,4857	   0,0995	  
Telcm	   	  	   0,2971	   0,3011	  
Trans	   	  	   1,1251	   0,0002	  
Whlsl	   	  	   1,0605	   0,0003	  
N	   	  	   4700	   	  	  
R2	  adj	   	  	   0,4506	   	  	  
 
